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THE U.S. V. THE RED CROSS: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
NOURA ERAKAT*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the International Committee for the Red Cross ("ICRC" or
"Committee") embarked on a momentous project to document and codify
customary international humanitarian law.
Using a broad methodological
approach to the formation of customary international humanitarian law, the ICRC
concluded that there exist 161 rules applicable during international and noninternational armed conflict that are of customary nature. The Study presented a
challenge to the United States' enduring rejection of the applicability of certain
provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II. Those are the legal, and
multilateral, milestones that extended the protections of the laws of armed conflict
to non-state actors engaged in untraditional warfare.
Between the close of the Second World War and 1977, most wars were fought
either between non-state actors and states (i.e., wars of liberation) or within states
(i.e., civil war and unrest). The state-centric character of international law was illequipped to regulate this non-traditional combat. In response, states re-convened
between 1972 and 1973 to legislate new provisions to supplement the meager
lexicon governing non-international armed conflict afforded by the Geneva
Convention's Common Article 3. These advancements constitute the Additional
Protocols.
The ICRC's Customary International Humanitarian Law Study ("Study")
asserts that its documentation of state practice, coupled with obligations, which
states deem to be legally binding, form a corpus of customary law that arguably
challenges some of the U.S.'s outstanding protests. Published in 2005, amidst the
U.S.'s Global War on Terror-which promised to incapacitate an enemy lacking a
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national identity and national borders-the Study was received hostilely by the
U.S. Administration. State Department Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger III and
Defense Department General Counsel William J. Haynes II admonished the
Study's findings, asserting that the ICRC's methodological approach to the
formation of customary international law lacked rigor and precision. The ICRC,
they argued, was excessively reliant on the verbal and written commitment of
states at the expense of their actual behavior. As such, an untold number of the
rules it identifies lack the binding character constitutive of customary law, and
international law more generally.
The discord between the U.S. and the ICRC reflects a methodological
divergence in approaches to the formation of customary international law.
Whereas traditional custom-reliant on state operational practice-represents the
law's descriptive accuracy, the modem approach- which looks to the trajectory of
the collective will of states-reflects its prescriptive appeal. The U.S. vividly
demonstrates this divergence in its examination of four customary rules proffered
by the ICRC. Among its illustrative case studies, the U.S. takes issue with Rule
157, that states have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts
over war crimes.
This paper shows that while the modern approach to custom is superior for
the determination of customary human rights and humanitarian law, the
methodological approach does not presuppose a particular outcome. To the
contrary, while the ICRC was correct to apply the modern approach in its Study, its
analysis, based upon its evidentiary findings, was imprecise. Therefore, its
conclusion, regarding the customary status of universal jurisdiction, is arguably
incorrect.
To demonstrate this case, the article uses the U.S.-ICRC debate as a backdrop
and begins by unpacking the U.S.'s critique of the ICRC's Study. It then briefly
explores the traditional and modem approaches to the formation of customary
international law. Next, it makes a normative argument for the application of the
modern approach to customary human rights and humanitarian law. The following
sections demonstrate how, even using the proper methodological approach, the
ICRC's analysis is partly flawed, thereby undermining the applicable scope of
universal jurisdiction to war crimes as asserted by Rule 157. The paper concludes
by drawing lessons, from this debate and case study, about the proper approach to
customary international humanitarian law.
II.

THE UNITED STATES VERSUS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS

In 1995, the ICRC began a comprehensive study to examine those laws of war
applicable in international and non-international armed conflict.' The ICRC's
1. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to US
Comments, 89 INT'L. REv. RED CRoss 473 (2007) (noting that the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
for the Protection of War Victims recommended that the ICRC, in collaboration with experts in
international humanitarian law ("11-1L"), prepare a report on the customary rules of IHL applicable in
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purpose was two-fold: first, to identify those Geneva treaty provisions that are
binding on non-party states and territories, 2 and second, to supplement the meager
detail available for the regulation of non-international armed conflict.3 In its
Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw Study, completed over ten years and
reliant on research from more than fifty countries, and archives from nearly forty
recent armed conflicts, the ICRC identified 161 rules to be of customary nature.
The ICRC used a classic approach developed by the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") to determine the existence of a general customary international
law.5 Customary international law generally requires the presence of two
elements, state practice and opiniojuris, or the belief that such practice is a legal
obligation, as opposed to one reflecting morality, reciprocity, courtesy, or
otherwise. 6 Accordingly, the ICRC relied both on verbal and physical acts of
states as constitutive of state practice so long as they represent official practice.
Though classical in its approach to establishing that a rule is of customary nature,
the ICRC did not require that opinio juris be demonstrated as a distinct and
separate element. Instead, it found that "more often than not, one and the same act
reflects practice and legal conviction."8 So long as the practice is sufficiently
dense, opiniojuris can be found within that practice and therefore its existence did
not need to be demonstrated separately.9 Significantly, the ICRC did not assert
that treaty ratification as a practice also represented legal conviction in what it
describes as a "cautious approach."' 0
In its response to the ICRC Study, the U.S. government took particular issue
with this methodological approach. While the U.S. acknowledged "the same
action may serve as evidence both of state practice and opinio juris," it insists

international and non-international armed conflict. The 26th International Conference of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent endorsed this recommendation in Geneva, which took place Dec. 3-7, 1995.).
2. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS ET AL., CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
VOLUME I: RULES xxxvi (2005) [hereinafter VOLUME 1].

3. Id. at xxxv ("Additional Protocol II usefully supplements Common Article 3, but it is still less
detailed than the rules governing international armed conflicts contained in Additional Protocol I.
Additional Protocol II contains a mere 15 substantive articles, whereas Additional Protocol I has more
than 80.").
4. Henckaerts, supra note 1, at 476-77.
5. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at xxxviii.
6. Id.
7. Id. at xxxix. For a detailed discussion of the ICRC's criteria for selecting relevant state
practice, see id. at xxxviii-xl.
8. Id. at xlvi.
9. Id.
10. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw: A Contribution
to the Understandingand Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L. REv. RED CROSS
175, 183 (2005) ("The study took the cautious approach that widespread ratification is only an
indication and has to be assessed in relation to other elements of practice, in particular the practice of
States not party to the treaty in question.").
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opinio juris cannot be inferred by practice but must be "assessed separately.""
The U.S.'s concerns reflect its cautionary approach to the relationship between
multilateral treaties and customary law.12 It chided the ICRC's approach, insisting
that opinio juris cannot be established by mere recitation of treaty provisions,
which may "as easily ... reflect policy considerations as legal considerations."' 3
The U.S. explains that to show that a rule is customary, the ICRC must be able to
prove that a state is legally obliged to observe a rule even in the absence of a
related treaty.14 The ICRC, however, did not consider a widely ratified treaty as
definitive but instead only as indicative of custom in the context of broader state
practice.
In regards to assessing practice, the U.S. government accepted the ICRC's
methodological approach but found the humanitarian organization's application
insufficiently rigorous. The U.S. argued that the ICRC did not establish sufficient
density of practice in many cases;' 5 that it gave undue weight to the statements of
non-governmental organizations;16 that it failed to give more weight to negative
practice in several cases; and that it erroneously relied upon state documents and
proclamations, namely upon military manuals and non-binding general assembly
resolutions.' 7 The government argues that while these materials may serve as an
indicator of opiniojuris, they cannot replace the veracity of operational practice.' 8
Finally, the U.S. admonished the ICRC for equating the state practice of specially
affected states with that of relatively lesser-affected states.' 9
Relying heavily upon the ICJ's decision in Military and Paramilitary
Activities in andAgainst Nicaragua,20 and North Sea ContinentalShelf,~2' the ICRC
agreed with the U.S. that the quantity of states is less relevant than their qualitative
value. Accordingly, the quantitative support for a rule is less significant in the case
where all specially affected states offered support. In cases where specially
affected states opposed a provision, the quantitative value of state support is

11. John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A U.S. Government Response to the
International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT'L.
REv. RED CROSS 443,446 (2007).
12. Id. (noting that at the time of drafting, the Additional Protocols reflected far-reaching
principles that reflected the aspiration of states and not what they believed to be a legal obligation
captured in international customary law).
13. Id. at 447.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 444.
16. Id. at 445.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The specially affected state doctrine reflects a principle derived from North Sea
Continental Shelf which held that practice "must include that of states whose interests are specially
affected." North Sea Continental Shelf (Den./Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, I 73 (Feb. 20).
20. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27).
21. North Sea Continental Shelf (Den./Ger./Neth.), 1969 1.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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arguably inconsequential.22 Still, the ICRC held that in the realm of warfare, all
states have an interest in humanitarian provisions and therefore their practice must
also be given due weight, thereby diminishing the role of specially affected states
in the determination of customary international humanitarian law. 23
The ICRC also held that state practice must be sufficiently similar among
states, but not necessarily identical. The Committee found that contrary practice
did not undermine the existence of a customary rule so long as other states
condemned the practice or the government itself denied it, thereby negating its
official nature. Significantly, the ICRC afforded great weight to verbal state
practice even in the face of repeated violations. In the case that a state wished to
change an existing rule of customary international law, it would "have to do so
through [its] official practice and claim to be acting as of right." 24
Where the ICRC insisted on general adherence and practice to reflect a rule's
customary nature, the U.S. insists upon detail and specificity. Even in the
formulation of its rules, the U.S. notes that the ICRC failed to state rules with
sufficient precision to reflect state practice and treaty obligations.25 The U.S.'s
stringent standards reflect a traditional approach to the formation of customary law
wherein, absent treaty law, binding rules are based on actual, not verbal, state
practice, and demonstrable opinion juris.26 In contrast, the ICRC accepts that a
legal principle can become customary when it achieves general support from the
international community as a collective whole. Like the holding in Nicaragua,it
assumes that state behavior conforms with custom and that non-conformity reflects
a breach rather than a seed for a new rule.27 The methodological divergence
evidenced by the U.S. and the ICRC reflects the two schools of thought underlying
the formation of customary international law: traditional and modern.

22. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at xliv ("[l]f 'specially affected States' do not accept the practice, it
cannot mature into a rule of customary international law, even though unanimity is not required as
explained.").
23. Id. at xlv.
24. Id. at xliv.
25. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 11, at 447 ("Thus, many rules are stated in a way that renders
them overbroad or unconditional, even though State practice and treaty language on the issue reflect
different, and sometimes substantially narrower, propositions.").
26. Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REv.
665, 667 (1986) ("Political scientists of the 'realist school' have expressed similar conclusions: power
and national interest, not law, determine government conduct. For the most part, the writings of recent
Secretaries of State, as well as international relations theorists and political scientists, ignore the subject
altogether. International law is thus relegated to the dustbin of idealism.").
27. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
186 (June 27).
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III. APPROACHES TO CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: TRADITIONAL AND
MODERN

International law's three primary sources are treaties, customary law, and
general principles of international law. 28 The establishment of customary, or tacit
consent, 29 is based on two elements: practice and opiniojuris.3 The philosophical
underpinnings of the two approaches to identifying whether a principle has
achieved customary status reflect the emphasis placed on each and/or both of these
elements.
A. TraditionalCustom
The two schools of thought, traditional and modern, respectively align with
law's descriptive accuracy and its prescriptive appeal.32 Traditional custom
emphasizes state practice and is driven by the law's descriptive accuracy.
Descriptive law generally describes what the law is or has been. It supposedly
corresponds to reality and therefore, is the content of international law.33 It can be
appealing in international law, where a hierarchal enforcement system is
underdeveloped at best or unavailable at worst. 34 Descriptive law represents a
deductive method to identify customary law, meaning that the law must be inferred
from examples of practice and facts alone.35 Emphasizing the evidentiary
significance of state practice, adherents argue that the international community
intended that custom reflect practice, and not that practice reflect custom. 36 This
formulation assumes that the practice of states is to be considered as an aggregate.
Accordingly, practice should perfectly reflect existing customary law as well as
any shifts it may undergo.
Resultant from the emphasis on state practice, traditional custom develops
slowly.3 It requires courts to ascertain custom by examining many years of state
practice and to find that a rule becomes customary international law when it

28. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 3 T.I.A.S.
[hereinafter "Statute ICJ"].
29. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 78 (B61a Kapossy & Richard Whatmore
Liberty Fund 2008).
30. Statute ICJ, supra note 28, art. 38(1)(b) (defining "international custom, as evidence
general principle accepted as law').
31. BIRGIT SCHLOTrER, DEvELOPMENTs INCUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY

1179
eds.,
of a
AND

THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL AD HOC CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA 36-37 (2010).

32. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditionaland Modem Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758 (2001).
33. Id. at 762.
34. Id.
35. SCHLOTTER, supra note 31, at 16.
36. Trimble, supra note 26, at 709.
37. Id. at 711.
38. Roberts, supra note 32, at 759; see also Katherine N. Guernsey, The North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 141, 143 (2000).
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reflects both uniform state practice over a long period of time, as well as a
conscious acceptance among states that the practice reflects a principle of law.39
Traditionalists therefore, consider treaty law to be more legitimate and
binding than newly-minted or controversial customary rules. 40 This school of
thought has found support among scholars and jurists alike. 4 1 Among said
supporters is Sir Robert Jennings who diverged from his colleagues in deciding
Nicaragua. He took issue with the validity of the ICJ's jurisdiction, which he
argued could not exist in the face of a U.S. multilateral treaty reservation.
Jennings disagreed that customary international law could be applied in lieu of the
relevant treaties where it could not be demonstrated that the treaty either codified
existing customary law or alternatively, that the treaty had given rise to a new
rule.42
This approach conceives of states as active lawmakers who bind themselves
only by explicit consent in ways that do not impede their sovereignty.43 The
Permanent Court of International Justice's decision in The Case of S.S. Lotus
captured this sentiment well when it held:
International law governs relations between independent States. The
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a
view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions on the
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed."
This passage in Lotus arguably stands for the proposition that international
law is regulative and not constitutive of state rights. 45 Coupled with a later passage
39. See Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in
DeterminingPrinciplesofinternationalLaw in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876, 877 (1983);
Benjamin Langille, It's "Instant Custom": How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist
Attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 147 (2003).
40. Trimble, supra note 26, at 669 (noting that treaty and customary law are not equally
authoritative and that "the relevance and true role of international law in the world, lies in national
political traditions and structures that support the domestic implementation of the two types of
international law.").
41. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individualsfor Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 301, 303-04 (1999) ("[S]tates create
international norms by reaching consent on the content of a rule. If a state later changes its mind, there
must be another-this time nonconsensual-rule that prevents the state from unilaterally withdrawing
its consent.").
42. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
530 (June 27) ("I am unable, however, to agree with the Court's persuasion that, whilst accepting the
pertinence of the reservation, it can, nevertheless, decide on the Nicaraguan Application by applying
general customary law, as it were in lieu of recourse to the relevant multilateral treaties."). The U.N.
Charter neither codified existing law nor did it, in the intervening years, generate a new rule.
43. Trimble, supra note 26, at 667-68.
44. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 1 44 (Sept. 7).
45. See Luc REYDAMs, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL

PERSPECTIVES 13 (2003).
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in Lotus, 46 it also suggests that a state's rights cannot be circumscribed unless there
exists a customary prohibition on such right.47 These propositions however do not
distinguish modernists from traditionalists as there is no formulation of customary
law that presumes consent on the part of states. 48 The distinction between modem
and traditional custom is not found here but rather in the methods used to identify
custom and the sources upon which commentators can rely.
Due to its insistence on the preeminence of operational state practice, at its
extreme, traditional custom risks standing in as an apology for state behavior
because it accepts principles as legally binding insofar as they reflect the national
interests of states. 49 It is an undemocratic proposition because it suggests that only
those states with the means to act can shape binding and applicable law. At its
core, this violates the premise that states are as equal to one another as are the
persons within each of those states to one another. As opposed to those who
believe that "[a] dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a
sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom,"50 traditionalists advocate that
power indeed produces difference.
B. Modern Custom
If it can be crudely summarized that traditionalists are committed to state
sovereignty, then it can be similarly summarized that modernists are committed to
human rights because of their emphasis on the equality of states and the law's
normative thrust.5' Modern custom espouses the theoretical equality of states and
therefore accepts the notion that each state equally contributes to the formation of
international law regardless of its available means and resources. Like their
traditional counterparts, modernists acknowledge the limitations inherent to an
international community lacking a compulsory adjudication system, but argue that
the necessary treatment for said lack is to be derived from procedural norms. 52
Modern custom insists that the legitimating force of customary law flows from a
commitment to democratic process.5 3

46. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 49 (Sept. 7).
47. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) (Van
Der Wyngaert, J., dissenting).
48. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
T 269 ("[I]n international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State
concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited .
49. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL., 335, 335 (2000) ("Either international law has been too far from politics and must move closer to
become effective, or it has become dangerously intermingled with politics and must assert its autonomy
to remain potent.").
50. VATrEL, supra note 29, at 75.
51. Roberts, supra note 32, at 762-63.
52. Id. at 762.
53. Id. ("Legal rules are more likely to engender respect in a decentralized system, possibly even
when the outcome is less favorable, if they result from a process perceived as legitimate.").
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As such, the modem approach emphasizes opiniojuris, to which all states can
contribute equally regardless of their disparate power. It relies on a deductive
approach that accepts that legal norms can be derived from general propositions
absent actual facts and practice. 54 This includes reliance upon the attitudes of
states found in multilateral treaties, general assembly resolutions, and state
declarations.
Unlike traditionalists who rely on a more precise approach,56
modernists derive opiniojuris from general practice, or previous determinations of
the ICJ, or other international tribunals.s5
Due to the accessibility of such statements and the speed with which
consensus can be established or a precedent deduced, modem custom can also
develop quickly and, even, instantly.58 As put by Professor Theodor Meron, "[t]he
modem approach . . . relies principally on loosely defined opinio juris and/or
inference from the widespread ratification of treaties or support for resolutions and
other 'soft law' instruments; thus, it is more flexible and open to the relatively
rapid acceptance of new norms."5 9 Taken to its extreme, the modem approach is
divorced from reality for it lacks an immediate connection to state behavior, will,
or interest.6 0
IV.

THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR THE MODERN APPROACH TO CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Notwithstanding the potential shortcomings inherent to each approach, the
modem approach to custom is superior in evaluating international human rights
and humanitarian law due to their specialized nature, the character of an
international society as a collective whole, and the unreliability of operational state
practice. Each of these observations implicates the formation of customary
international humanitarian law. Consider first that human rights and humanitarian
law are universal in scope and constitute non-reciprocal rights. These
characteristics distinguish humanitarian and human rights treaty provisions from
discrete contractual rights, and they should therefore be evaluated with greater
flexibility. Additionally, in the face of rapid globalization, it is anachronistic and
inaccurate to accept that the international community is no more than the aggregate
54. Id. at 763.
55. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
175 (June 27) ("The Court does not consider that ... it can be claimed that all the customary rules
which may be invoked have a content exactly identical to that of the rules contained in the treaties
which cannot be applied by virtue of the United States reservation.").
56. LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (7th ed. 2008) (describing the
establishment of opinio juris by showing "positive evidence of the recognition of the validity of the
rules in question in the practice of states").
57. Id. at 8-9.
58. See Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International
Customary Law? 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 35-40 (1965).
59. Theodor Meron, Revival of CustomaryHumanitarianLaw, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 817 (2005);
see generally Langille, supra note 39.
60. Kennedy, supra note 49, at 102, as quoted in Roberts, supra note 32 at 767 (explaining that
international law "has been too far from politics and must move closer to become effective. . . .").
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of approximately two hundred states. Instead, as it concerns human rights and
humanitarian law in particular, international society must be evaluated as a
collective whole, wherein all states are affected by human rights and humanitarian
law violations. Accordingly, this diminishes the value of specially affected states
in the assessment of customary international humanitarian law. Finally, a strict
reliance on operational state practice in armed conflict neither reflects the law as it
is, has been, or should be. As such, the words of states as well as what can be
deduced from their support of "soft law" instruments should be afforded more
weight in the formation of customary international humanitarian law.
Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw Constitute SpecializedRegimes
that can be Interpretedwith GreaterFlexibility

A.

Human rights and humanitarian law constitute a specialized regime, or what is
often referred to as a self-contained regime. The Permanent Court of International
Justice coined the term of art in its adjudication of S.S. Wimbledon.61 There, the
court applied this concept in order to resolve a matter of treaty interpretation
concerning the relationship between "two sets of primary international
In its 2006 Study, "Fragmentation of International Law:
obligations." 62
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,"
the International Law Commission ("ILC") found that such specialized treaty
regimes are not exceptional. Rather they constitute a series of systems and subsystems that resolve conflicts differently than would general international law.
Citing the ICJ's decision in Nicaragua,the ILC explains that within a specialized
regime, a state may only resort to remedies made available within their own regime
of accountability "that [make] other ways of reaction inappropriate." 63
1.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Represent Non-Reciprocal
and Universal Interests

Significantly, human rights treaties do not create reciprocal obligations
between state parties but instead create obligations between states and individuals
to whom they owe a duty.64 More generally, human rights obligations serve an

61. S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, 32 (Aug. 17).
62. Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in
InternationalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 483, 491 (2006).
63. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug.
11, 2006, 125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006).
64. Bayak Cali, Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation:Human Rights, in THE OXFORD GUIDE
To TREATIES, 524-48 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012). But see Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 62, at 527.
("While human rights have an objective, public-law-like, perhaps even constitutional, character,
technically, they nonetheless formally remain 'reciprocal engagements between contracting States.' It is
crucial to distinguish between reciprocity as a formal characteristic of a norm on the one hand, and
reciprocity as a substantive do-ut-des relationship on the other. Human rights treaties do not involve
such a substantive exchange, since their ultimate beneficiaries are individuals under the jurisdiction of
the state undertaking the obligation. However, since human rights remain 'mutual, bilateral
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interconnected network, which benefits from its collective enforcement." The
treaty context also carves out a specialized treatment of human rights and
humanitarian law. While Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("VCLT") states that a material breach of a treaty will be grounds for
another party to suspend its compliance with the treaty in whole or in part,
subsection 5 makes clear that this does not apply to provisions relating to the
protection of human persons "contained in treaties of a humanitarian character." 66
The VCLT, which otherwise applies trans-substantively, asserts that failure by one
party to observe humanitarian treaty provisions, in particular, does not release
another party from observing its duties.
Specialization, however, does not isolate a treaty regime from general
international law. Just as "[s]ocial systems cannot exist in splendid isolation from
their environment," specialized regimes share a relationship with general
international law at least at the level of interpretation.68 In its decision concerning
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the ICJ endorsed this position and added that the universal character of,
and the extensive participation in establishing, multilateral treaties gives rise to
"greater flexibility in the international practice concerning multilateral
conventions."69 Therefore, the principles of a Convention can be binding on states
even without a conventional obligation since its purpose is purely humanizing and
civilizing and no single state incurs any advantages or disadvantages by being a
party to it. Instead, all states share a common interest in compliance. 70
2.

A Human Rights or Humanitarian Treaty Provision Can Develop
Quickly and Need Not 'Harden'

The specialized regime governing human rights and humanitarian law
together with their universal and non-reciprocal character informs how relevant
treaty provisions should be interpreted. While a contractual treaty provision, of
bilateral character, should harden into customary law, the generalizable nature of
human rights and humanitarian law need not crystallize to be binding upon all
other states. Accordingly, custom can develop over a short period of time and

undertakings' owed to the other state parties to the respective convention, there is no compelling
systematic reason why states should be precluded from bilateral enforcement of human rights.").
65. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 62, at 527 ("Unlike international treaties of the classical kind,
the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It
creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the
words of the Preamble, benefit from a 'collective enforcement."' (quoting Ireland v. United Kingdom,
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 239 (1978)).
66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
67. Id. art. 58.
68. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 62, at 492.
69. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28).
70. Id. at 23.
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opinio juris can be inferred from state practice so long as such practice is
sufficiently dense.
Oppenheim's proposition that a treaty must either be a derogation, or an
affirmation, of underlying custom suggests that a treaty provision cannot become
custom until it "hardens." 7 1 This view reflects the notion that treaties are contracts
and all contracts must be restrictively evaluated.72 The restrictive view, however,
confuses the provisions that can be generalized and that are intended to be
universally applicable with strict entitlement rights. Whereas reciprocal rights
between two or more states reflect particular interests that should be evaluated like
contractual terms, a universal right can be more flexibly evaluated. Significantly,
at the time of writing, Oppenheim commented that it is not clear whether or not
slavery was acceptable. Shortly thereafter, the ILC found that the prohibition on
the slave trade was 'one of the most obvious and best settled rules of jus cogens'
in that even new treaties could not derogate from it,"73 thereby casting doubt on
such a restrictive approach to the determination of customary humanitarian law.
The ICJ in North Sea adopted the restrictive approach where it stated that
state support for a treaty provision does not satisfy opinio juris, which must be
demonstrated separately in order to affirm a principle's existence as customary
law. The problem is that this does not accurately apply to human rights and
humanitarian law. Professor Anthony D'Amato points out that the article in
question in North Sea represents the right to a specific title, and therefore, as noted
by the ICJ, cannot be altered by implicit consent. 74 In contrast, those rights that are
generalizable are intended to reach beyond their parties and can apply to them
almost instantly.
Professor Jonathan Chamey agrees that while technical and narrow treaty
provisions may not be applicable to third parties, the same is not true for those
generalizable rules regarding human rights obligations. 76 Charney echoes
D'Amato's concern that a specific rule, one that "requires highly technical
methods of implementation . . . [and] require[s] the specificity of an international

agreement, as contrasted with more generalized obligations that are possible to
implement as custom" is less likely to give rise to a customary law.77 In the case
that a rule could not be established absent an international institution or treaty, it is

71. Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1110,1132 (1982).
72. Id. ("This is more a statement of a conclusion than a reason, a conclusion that follows from
equating treaties with contracts and then taking a restrictive view of contracts.").
73. Id. at 1133.
74. Id.at 1143.
75. Id. at 1144.
76. Jonathan Chamey, InternationalAgreements and the Development of Customary International
Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 983 (1986) ("[I]t is difficult to merge a generalized principle. . . into
international law without the . .. detail that must be negotiated individually. The same is not true for
most of the Vienna Convention's rules relating to international agreements; nor . . . in the case of
human rights obligations.").
77. Id.
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not eligible to become a customary law.
In contrast, "[a]n agreement which
addresses generalized interests and aspirations of the international community may
be more likely to produce new law than an agreement which focuses on specific
state interests.
The notion that generalizable interests may represent aspirations common to
the international community is resonant with the Joint Separate Opinion in the
ICJ's 2002 Arrest Warrant decision ("Joint Separate Opinion").80 There, the ICJ
deliberated whether the Democratic Republic of the Congo's incumbent foreign
affairs minister was immune from prosecution under Belgium's universal
jurisdiction statute from war crimes and crimes against humanity. Without
discussing the legality of universal jurisdiction, the Court found the minister
immune under customary international law. Justices Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal took issue with the Court's scope of inquiry and held that it could not
deliberate the application of immunity without determining whether or not
Belgium had a right to exercise universal jurisdiction. In their Joint Separate
Opinion they found that there indeed exists such a right, as indicated by a trend to
prosecute those offenses that are universally offensive.
The three Justices emphasized that human rights are of general and global
concern. Since they represent interests that are not specific to any state, the
recognition of human rights as customary law is a palatable trend. Consider their
discussion on multilateral treaties:
The series of multilateral treaties with their special jurisdictional
provisions reflect a determination by the international community that
those engaged in war crimes, hijacking, hostage taking, torture should
not go unpunished. Although crimes against humanity are not yet the
object of a distinct convention, a comparable international indignation at
such acts is not to be doubted. 82
The Justices infer from the series of multilateral treaties a particular trend that
bends towards the arc of justice. This leads them to conclude that similar
indignation cannot be doubted where crimes of humanity are concerned
notwithstanding the lack of a treaty articulating such consensual repugnance.
Justice Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buerguenthal recognize that this is not a
unilateral trend, but rather one that reflects a balancing of interests in consideration
of other general international law.8 3 They write that while there is a discernible
78. Id. ("Furthermore, if international institutions are required to be used or established,
customary law is inappropriate.").
79. Id.
80. See Arrest Warrant 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 837 (Feb. 14)
(Higgins J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J., dissenting).
81. Id.151.
82. Id.
83. Id. 75 ("These trends reflect a balancing of interests. On the one scale, we find the interest of
the community of mankind to prevent and stop impunity for perpetrators of grave crimes against its
members; on the other, there is the interest of the community of States to allow them to act freely on the
inter-State level without unwarranted interference.").
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global trend that rejects immunity for human rights violators, "the law of privileges
and immunities . . . retains its importance since immunities are granted to high

state officials to guarantee the proper functioning of the network of mutual interstate relations, which is of paramount importance for a well-ordered and
harmonious international system."8
Even in their final analysis, however, the Justices do not distinguish between
sovereignty and human rights. Instead, they ascribe value to sovereignty insofar as
it promotes international harmony and stability, thus suggesting that political
actors, including states, should celebrate, rather than shun, the law's prescriptive
force. Accordingly, treaty provisions, which represent generalizable interests, like
humanitarian and human rights provisions do, need not harden into custom over a
long period of time. Relatedly, opiniojuriscan be inferred from sufficiently dense
state practice when establishing the existence of a customary international
humanitarian law.
B.

InternationalSociety is a Collective Whole, Not a Sum ofIts Parts,
Thereby Diminishingthe Significance ofSpecially Affected States upon
the Formation of Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw

International society is a collective whole as opposed to a sum of its parts.
The community of nations, or the whole, has particular concerns distinct from each
of its states, or its individual parts. This is particularly true as it concerns matters,
like humanitarian ones, that constitute common interests. The manner in which a
war is fought and regulated is of concern to all nations individually and
collectively, regardless of direct participation. A state's non-participation in armed
conflict does not diminish its potential participation in one in the near or long-term
future. Accordingly, while some states may have more experience with armed
conflict or human rights challenges, this does not make them "specially affected"
insofar as the formation of custom is concerned. This significantly diminishes the
consideration of specially affected states in the formation of customary
international humanitarian law and heightens the value of soft-law considerations.
1. The World is an Aggregate Whole and Not a Sum of its Parts
At the turn of the nineteenth century, it may have been sound to conceive of
the international community as the aggregate of its many states. Then, those
existent states amounted to a little more than forty in number.85 Their underdeveloped collective identity reflected their nascent form.86 Less sophisticated
forms of technology limited the ability to communicate rapidly. In light of these
historic circumstances, it is reasonable to think that their unspoken consensus
84. Id.
85. See PHILLIP MARTIN, EcONOMIC INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION: THE MEXICO-U.S. CASE 3

(2003), available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussion-papers/2003
/en_GB/dp2003-35/ ("There were 190 recognized nation-states in 2000, up from 43 in 1900, and each
has a system of passports to distinguish citizens from foreigners, border controls to inspect persons who
want to enter, and policies that affect the settlement and integration of noncitizens.").
86. Id.
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would develop as the result of strict observance to aggregated state practice over a
long period of time.
However, those few nations have grown to number nearly two hundred states
in the twenty-first century.87 New states have entered the community of nations
accepting, as a matter of precondition, those customary rules upheld by the
palpable collective body.8 8 Technology in the twenty-first century has made
instantaneous communication possible, not just between heads of state, but among
Rapid
and between individual units comprising the global population.
capital,
and
communication has not only facilitated the flow of ideas but goods,
90
89
labor as well. Globalization has birthed global markets, global environmental
conditions, 91 global public health concerns, 92 and in so doing has established a
collective form. The impact of rapid news sharing, together with the collective
form of international society, makes practice less controlling and the possibility for
rapid formation of customary law more possible. Communication technology has
enabled an expedited consensus-formation process. Rapid communicationtogether with a collective international society-have developed the capacity to
espouse a global attitude without having to patiently witness the evolutionary
process reflect those preferences. 93
The lack of a hierarchal order with effective executive powers does not
diminish international society's collective character. 94 To the contrary, even
powerful states, that presumably prefer diplomacy to law, depend on the order
afforded by law.95 The extent to which states desire law and "[t]he amount and
kind of law which the international community will achieve will depend, of course,
on the degree of homogeneity of the political system and the degree of common or

87. Id.
88. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY R. 136, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.15

(1985), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/adms.shtml ("If the Security Council
recommends the applicant State for membership, the General Assembly shall consider whether the
applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the
Charter and shall decide, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, upon its
application for membership.").
89. See Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of
Imposition and Appropriation,51 HARv. INT'L L.J. 475, 548 (2010).
90. See AKIRA IRiYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 18 (2002).

91. Id. at 177-79.
92. See STEFAN ELBE, SECURITY AND GLOBAL HEALTH: TOWARD THE MEDICALIZATION OF
INSECURITY 30 (2010).
93. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 12-13 (2d ed. 1979). I

borrow the term "attitude" from Louis Henkin, who acknowledges its existence and uses it throughout
his treatise.
94. Id. at 24 ("In a society of sovereign states, in the absence of an effective legislature
representing all competing interests and able to accommodate them, nations must be free to pursue their
interests, to work out reasonable accommodations with other. What is called for is the flexibility of
diplomacy, not the straitjacket of law.").
95. Id. at 15 (noting the law formalizes relationships between states, regulates them, and predicts
the consequences of their behavior).
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reciprocal interest."96 Such integrated concerns are most pronounced in regard to
human rights and humanitarian law because of their non-reciprocal nature.
Consider that adherence to law of a normative character often works to enhance
the collective benefit of all states without detriment to any single state.
The Higgins-Kooijmans-Buergenthal Joint Separate Opinion in Arrest
Warrant articulated this when it noted that certain states can act as "agents for the
international community" to prosecute those offenses that are "damaging to the
interests of all."97 Significantly, the Justices note, this is a "vertical notion of the
authority of action," which "is significantly different from the horizontal system of
international law envisaged in the Lotus case."9
Accordingly, international
society shares certain humanitarian values and interests as a collective whole,
distinct from the interest from any one state, or group of states.
2.

The Significance of Specially Affected States is Diminished in the
Assessment of Customary International Humanitarian Law

International society's collective character diminishes the impact of any one
state upon the formation of customary international humanitarian law. Instead, its
position towards humanitarian provisions can be evaluated as a psychological
element among states, regardless of their practice. The ICJ articulated the concept
of specially affected states in its North Sea ContinentalShelfdecision." North Sea
reflects the textbook approach to establishing whether or not a treaty provision
reflects, or gives rise, to customary law. The Restatement Third summarizes North
Sea as saying that "a treaty rule might become 'a general rule of international law'
if there were 'a very widespread and representative participation in the convention
. . . provided it includes that of states whose interests were particularly
affected."' 00 However, there, the ICJ addressed a specific right to entitlement as it
concerned a geographical coast specific to only three parties.' 0 No other state has
the potential to share that specific interest.
In contrast, even those states that are not engaged in armed conflict have the
potential to become involved in such conflict in the short or long-term future.
Although humanitarian law specially affects all states, the doctrine remains
relevant. As acknowledged by the ICRC, a state's persistent objection to a

96.
97.
(Higgins
98.
99.

Id. at 30.
Arrest Warrant 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, I 51, 61 (Feb. 14)
J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J., dissenting).
Id.151.
North Sea Continental Shelf (Den./Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 74 (Feb. 20).

100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.

§

102 (1997); see also

Craig L. Carr and Gary L. Scott, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary International
Law, 25 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71, 72 (1996) (reformulating this concept and suggesting a threepronged model for the determination of whether a treaty provision has attained customary status. The
authors proffer that a generalizable treaty provision evident in multilateral treaties can attain customary
status if there are (1) a sufficient number of states engaged in the practice; (2) that those states most
affected by the practice are among them; and (3) that the treaty provision is not subject to reservations.).
101. North Sea Continental Shelf (Den./Ger.Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 5-6 (Feb. 20).
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developing norm that specifically affects them can frustrate the crystallization of
such a norm.' 02 Otherwise, the attitude of all states is considerably influential.
North Sea also stood for the proposition that in the absence of protest, a
practice becomes binding customary law so long as it is evidenced by uniformity
among states and acceptance that it is binding upon third states.,0 3 Even though it
was not certain whether the "acquiescence stemmed from a consciousness of a
clear legal duty-as distinguished from a recognition of the reasonableness of the
claim made,"'" the ICJ considered that the lack of protest among states constituted
meaningful opiniojuris. Accordingly, practice is not just found in the practice of
states, but also in their attitudinal response to the behavior of other states.
Moreover, the degree of uniformity in practice need only be general and not
exact. North Sea draws upon the Court's Asylum case to make this claim. 05 In
Asylum, the ICJ rejected Colombia's argument that the Montevideo Convention of
1933 on Political Asylum codified existing custom for several reasons, including
the fact that general uniformity could not be demonstrated among the Latin
American states. 0 6 Notably, the ICJ in Asylum distinguished universal adherence
to a rule from general uniformity in practice. 07 J.L. Brierly also captures this
where he expounds that with regard to the uniformity of practice, the difference "is
not one between uncertainty and certainty in formulation, but merely between a
greater and a less degree of uncertainty."' 0 8
Stated differently, state practice by a handful of powerful states does not
necessarily trump the will of international society. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, former
member of the ILC, and ICJ jurist, cautioned against such excessive deference to
the practice and will of states because the force of international law is "grounded in
a factor superior to and independent of the will of states-a factor which gives
validity to the law created by the will of states. That superior source is the
102. Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the FinalFrontier: The Law of War in Space, 48
A.F. L. REv. 1, 69 (2000); see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary InternationalHumanitarian
Law: Taking Stock of the ICRC Study, 78 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 435, 449 (2010).
103. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1970).
104. Id.
105. Id. ("The Party which relies on a custom . . . must prove that this custom is established in such
a manner that it has become binding on the other Party . . . that the rule invoked . . is in accordance
with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and that this usage is the
expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial
State.").
106. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (noting that other reasons
included the limited number of states that endorsed the Convention and the fact that the Convention in
question merely modified an earlier Convention).
107. Id. ("The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and
contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the
official views expressed on various occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid
succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice
has been so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is not
possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the
alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offense.").
108. J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 1963).
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objective fact of the existence of an interdependent community of states."l 09 Oscar
Schachter adds that if commitment to descriptive law is taken to its extreme,
powerful states would have unfettered latitude to define the rules for themselves
risking acceptance of international society as an '"anarchical order of power' in
which might makes right,""t0 thereby rendering meaningless the preferences of the
collective whole.
In their 1999 address to the American Society of International Law, Bruno
Simma and Andreas L. Paulus attempt to reconcile the traditional approach with
the normative underpinnings of human rights. They argue that adherents to law's
descriptive accuracy acknowledge that there are substantive limits on the influence
of power alone because excessive discretion risks the loss of political authority,
and consequently, political influence."' Moreover, they posit that as other actors
assume greater importance in shaping international norms, the exclusivity afforded
to the will of states in norm creation will conversely shrink.112 Simma and Paulus
acknowledge the potential of the law's transformative force, so long as the claim is
not surrendered to "normativity and the prescriptive force of law.""' Such
surrender is not possible given that state attitudes, even as a collective whole,
reflect a balancing of state interests that is not subsumed by normative values.
Therefore, the value of specially affected states is diminished, and the value of
soft-law instruments is heightened in the formation of customary international
humanitarian law.
C.

OperationalPracticeis an UnreliableSource of Customary
InternationalHumanitarianLaw

In its response to the ICRC, the U.S. argues that nothing can outweigh actual
state practice in the assessment of customary international law.1 4 It contends that
its own military manuals, which the ICRC had cited as evidence of international
custom, neither reflect opinio juris"i5 nor state practicell 6 because they represent a
mix of policy and law. However, strict operational state practice is an unreliable
source of customary law for at least two reasons. First, operational practices are
neither widely available nor plainly known. Second, in cases where a global value
is at stake, consistent practice alone cannot undermine a rule's customary nature.
109. LAUTERPACHT, supranote 103, at 58.
110. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
113, 119 (1986).
111. Simma & Paulus, supra note 41, at 305.
112. Id. at 307.
113. Id.
114. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 11, at 445.
115. Id. at 447 ("States often include guidance in their military manuals for policy, rather than
legal, reasons. For example, the United States long has stated that it will apply the rules in its manuals
whether the conflict is characterized as international or non-international, but this clearly is not intended
to indicate that it is bound to do so as a matter of law in non-international conflicts.").
116. Id. at 445 ("Although manuals may provide important indications of State behavior and opinio
juris, they cannot be a replacement for a meaningful assessment of operational State practice in
connection with actual military operations.").
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In its discussions on the customary law applicable to internal conflicts, the
International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia ("ICTY") largely ignored
battlefield practices and relied on verbal statements, declarations, and
resolutions." 7 The ICTY explained that examination of state practice:
[I]s rendered extremely difficult by the fact that not only is access to the
theater of military operations normally refused to independent observers
(often even to the ICRC) but information on the actual conduct of
hostilities is withheld by the parties to the conflict; what is worse, often
recourse to it is has to misinformation with a view to misleading the
enemy as well as public opinion and foreign Governments." 8
In addition to the logistical restraints impeding perfect knowledge of
battlefield operations, states often engage in practices that they believe are illegal.
To accept that such engagement is evidentiary of a customary rule's waning force
would lead to absurd results in light of the unlimited possibilities of war's
gruesome horrors." 9 Professor Schachter suggests that in order to determine
whether or not a rule maintains its customary force, observers should search for
consensus regarding a rule's fundamental character. He explains, "[w]hen a
principle is repeatedly and unanimously declared to be a basic legal rule from
which no derogation is allowed, even numerous violations do not become state
practice constitutive of a new rule." 20
The case of torture is particularly illustrative here. During the Global War on
Terror ("GWOT") states systematically exerted force, described as torture, to
persons in their custody.121 If observers were to accept these operational practices
as controlling, they would have to accept that such widespread practice did not
breach the customary prohibition 22 of torture, but rather, constituted the seed for a
Ostensibly the new rule would make
new international customary rule.
warfare when combatants, by
during
unconventional
the
use
of
torture
permissible
virtue of their unlawful conduct, voluntarily forfeit the law's protection.123 This
conclusion, however, is inconsistent with the fact that, despite the widespread
practice of torture, the international community has not adjusted its collective
117. Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International
HumanitarianLaw, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 239 (1996).
118. Id. at 240.
119. Schachter, supra note 110, at 130 ("This argument is no more convincing than the assertion
that if a large number of rapes and murders are not punished, the criminal laws are supplanted and legal
restraints disappear for everyone.").
120. Id. at 131.
121. See Lisa Hajar, American Torture: The Price Paid,The Lessons Learned,39 MIDDLE E. REP.
(2009), availableat http://www.merip.org/mer/mer25 1/american-torture.
122. See Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment at 3
(July 20, 2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf (explaining that the
"[p]rohibition of torture is part of customary international law and a preemptory norm (jus cogens)");
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate And Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.
3), [2000] 1A.C. 147, 156 (H.L.) (describing the ban on torture as jus cogens).
123. See FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERRILLA PARTIES: CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAWS AND
USAGES OF WAR 18 (1862).
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admonition and prohibition on the use of torture. This is evidenced by the
numerous state-led lawsuits filed against alleged torturers,124 as well as states
condemning the use of torture. 125
This underscores the presumption raised in Nicaragua that states conform
with customary law unless they explicitly express otherwise.126 Accordingly, if
during the course of said practice, states explicitly defended the use of torture and
other states acquiesced to its use, then observers should accept that a seed for a
new rule has been planted. On the other hand, if during the course of torture, no
state defended its use and other states objected to it, then the practice must be
viewed as a breach of customary law thereby affirming its validity and application.
From this example, we can draw four principles. First, there is a presumption
that states comport with international customary law. Second, strict reliance on
operational state practice is an inadequate source of customary international law.
Third, to accurately determine the enduring legitimacy of customary law, observers
must afford due weight to state declarations, resolutions, and statements during the
course of said practices. Finally, observers must account for the negative practice
of states that can be interpreted as acquiescence.
Customary international humanitarian law, in particular, is an attitudinal
position that reflects obligatory norms that have shaped practice as opposed to
habitual norms that have come to represent legal obligations. Due to the
specialized nature of the human rights and humanitarian legal regime, together
with the international community's character as a collective whole, and because of
the unreliability of operational state practice, this is especially true where morally
loaded norms are at issue. Therefore, customary rules can develop quickly without

124. Hajjar, supra note 121 ("In 2005, an Italian court issued indictments for 22 CIA agents who
had kidnapped Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (aka Abu Omar) in Milan in February 2003 and transported
him to Egypt for torture. In 2007, a German court issued arrest warrants for 13 CIA agents involved in
the December 2003 kidnapping of Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen, from Macedonia. He was
transported to Afghanistan where he was tortured and held incommunicado for months ....
in an
attempt to avoid public acknowledgment ... [the CIA] dumped him in a remote area in Albania, from
which he eventually made it back to Germany.").
125. Id. (including the Canadian government apologizing to and paying $10 million to Maher
Arrar, a Canadian-Syrian national who the U.S. rendered to Syria where he endured ten months of
torture and in the U.K., the controversy over Binyam Mohammed, a Guantanamo Bay detainee who
was subject to systematic torture, led to intense public controversy, and to the first criminal
investigation against British intelligence agents for their collusion in CIA torture); see also Jay C.
Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (August 1, 2020), http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream
/2041/70964/00355_020801_001display.pdf (demonstrating that, though the U.S. did not condemn the
use of torture, it went to great lengths to distinguish its treatment of and policy towards detainees from
torture: "for an act to constitute torture ... it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain
amounting torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering
to amount to torture . . . it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g.,
lasting for months or even years.").
126. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27).
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waiting decades for the law to harden; the influence of specially affected states is
significantly diminished; the value of soft-law instruments is heightened; opinio
juris and state practice can be deduced from the same event or articulationl 27 and
can be reflected by the reaction, or the lack thereof, of the international
community; and, in some cases, they can develop instantly from multilateral treaty
provisions. These are not absolute rules; instead they reflect a rebuttable
presumption of sorts. They are general assumptions in the approach to the
customary human rights and humanitarian rules that are still open to challenge
based on the specific nature-permissive, operational, or obligatory-of the rule in
question.
Under this formulation, the U.S. approach to establishing customary law is
rigid and inadequate. It does not consider the proper approach to the formation of
custom with distinct consideration for the nature of human rights and humanitarian
law. In contrast, the ICRC approach, which leans towards, but is not necessarily
modem, is more appropriate. It has the capacity to interpret developing customary
norms based on a balance of opinio juris and state practice. The ICRC avoids
paralysis in its approach by not affording undue weight to operational state practice
and by deriving opiniojuris and state practice from the same incident or act. In the
words of Jean-Marie Henckaerts, co-author of the ICRC Study, there is no
mathematical standard to establish customary law. 128
V.

RULE 157: STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO VEST UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN
THEIR NATIONAL COURTS OVER WAR CRIMES

Notwithstanding the ICRC's correct methodological approach, its analysis as
to Rule 157-which explains that states have the right to vest universal jurisdiction
in their national courts over war crimes 129-is not immune from critique. The
ICRC's failure to properly distinguish war crimes from grave breaches makes
debatable whether the evidence it collated reflects no more than state adherence to
treaty obligations. Moreover, the ICRC does not adequately account for state
protest to universal jurisdiction up to the time of writing. Finally, the intervening
developments between 2005 and 2011 demonstrate a regressive trend that also puts
the ICRC's findings into question. While these findings do not negate the right to
vest universal jurisdiction as a customary right, they do signify that the customary
rule should be more attenuated and precise.
To examine the ICRC's analysis of universal jurisdiction, this section will
begin by unpacking the U.S. critique of the ICRC's analysis. It will then show
127. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY
(GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW, LONDON CONFERENCE (2000) ("[M]ost members of the Committee
agreed that, where practice exists which satisfies the conditions set out in Part II and is not covered by
one of the exceptions discussed in Section 17, it is not necessary to prove the existence of an opinio
juris.").
128. Skype Interview with Jean Marie Henckaerts, Legal Advisor to ICRC (Nov. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter Henckaerts Interview]; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International
HumanitarianLaw: Taking Stock of the ICRCStudy, 78 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 435, 449 (2010).
129. Id.
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how the distinction between the treaty provision giving rise to universal
jurisdiction and the universality principle's customary form supports the ICRC's
definition of universal jurisdiction as a permissive right.
Next, it will explore the implications of the ICRC's failure to adequately
demonstrate the distinction between grave breaches and war crimes upon its
conclusions. Finally, it will examine how state protests before and since the
publication of the Study undermine the scope and meaning of universal jurisdiction
as asserted by Rule 157.
Universal jurisdiction is one of the seven bases for jurisdiction identified in
legal doctrine.130 Unlike the other bases for jurisdiction, which establish a direct
link between a state and the right to prosecute an individual, universal criminal
jurisdiction is based solely on the nature of the crime. It "is the ability of the court
of any state to try persons for crimes committed outside its territory that are not
linked to the state by the nationality of the suspect or the victims or by harm to the
state's own national interests."'
Former U.N. High Commissioner on Human
Rights Mary Robinson explained that the principle of such jurisdiction
[I]s based on the notion that certain crimes are so harmful to
international interests that the states are entitled-and even obliged-to
bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of
the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim.132
Although closely related, it is distinct from the treaty provision obligating
states to extradite or prosecute ("aut dedere aut judicare") someone alleged to
have committed a war crime. 133 According to the ICRC, aut dedere autjudicare
stands for the proposition that states are not to provide safe haven to criminal
suspects. Accordingly, states are required to either surrender the person to an
international criminal court or a national court with the capacity to prosecute such
crimes. Where it fails to do so, it must prosecute the alleged in its national courts
presumably pursuant to universal jurisdiction.134 In contrast, the ICRC contends,

130. REYDAMS, supra note 45, at 21-22 ("Doctrine identifies up to seven principles: (1) the
principle of territoriality, (2) the principle of the nationality of the offender (or active personality
principle), (3) the principle of the nationality of the victim (or passive personality principle), (4) the
principle of the flag, (5) the principle of protection, (6) the principle of universality, and (7) the
representation principle.").
131. AMNESTY INT'L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD SUPPORT THIS
ESSENTIAL INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE TOOL, 10 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter JUSTICE TOOL], available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/015/2010/en/72ab4ccf-4407-42d3-8ctb-46ad6aada
059/ior53015201Oen.pdf.
132. STEPHEN MACEDO, ET AL., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28
(2001), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive jur.pdf.
133. AMNESTY INT'L, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR
PROSECUTE (AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE) 8 (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE],
available at http://www.amnesty.org/ar/libray/asset/IOR40/001/2009/en/a4761626-f2Oa-1ldd-855f392123cb5f06/ior400012009en.pdf.
134. Id.
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universal jurisdiction in customary law is a permissive right to prosecute a heinous
crime in a state's national courts irrespective of an extradition request.135
The U.S. argues that three methodological errors undermine the ICRC's
conclusion that states can exercise universal jurisdiction in their national courts as
a matter of custom: (1) the lack of uniformity over the definition of war crimes
across states; (2) the failure of state practice cited to establish either an accepted
definition of universal jurisdiction or the existence of "pure" universal jurisdiction;
and (3) insufficient state practice of prosecutions not connected to the forum
state.1 36 The U.S.'s overarching concern reflects its belief that the state practice
and opinio juris collated by the ICRC reflects a treaty rule and not a distinct
customary law.' 3 7 The treaty provision, aut dedere autjudicare, provides that a
state that has the ability to establish custody of a suspect accused of committing a
serious violation of humanitarian law in international armed conflict must hand
over or try the accused as a matter of duty. It is derived from dozens of
multilateral treaties.' 3 8 The Geneva Conventions-as laid out in Common Article
49 of the First Geneva Convention ("GCI"), Article 50 of the Second Geneva
Convention ("GCII"), Article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention ("GCIII"), and
Article 146 ("GCIV") of the Fourth Geneva Convention-provide that High
Contracting Parties have an obligation to prosecute, but not extradite persons,
within their territory suspected of committing grave breaches. 3 9
Accordingly, the U.S. Government tries to illustrate that the ICRC's evidence
of state practice and opinio juris simply reflects compliance with the Geneva
Conventions. The authors write:
The nine cases in which States claimed jurisdiction based on customary
rights come from only six States ... . The practice of six States is very
weak evidence of the existence of a norm of customary international law
.... Indeed in many of these cases, States were prosecuting acts that
were committed before the Geneva Conventions were adopted, but that

135. Henckaerts, supra note 1, at 476 ("Permissive rules ... are supported by acts that recognize
the right to behave in a given way but that do not, however, require such behaviour .... [Rule 157] is
such a rule.").
136. Bellinger & Haynes, supranote 11, at 466-67.
137. Id. at 469-70.
138. See REYDAMS, supranote 45, at 44-47 (explaining that before World War II, only three of the
one hundred international instruments with penal characteristics established a universality principle. In
contrast, post-World War II "[s]ome two dozen treaties [were] adopted to criminalize certain conduct
and establish a form of universal repression."). Articles 5 (obligation to establish jurisdiction), 7
(obligation to extradite or prosecute), and 8 (extradition) of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment reflect the three clauses establishing the aut
dedere autjudicareprinciple in the two dozen treaties mentioned in REYDAMS, supranote 45.
139. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions].
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ultimately were considered grave breaches in the Conventions. Thus,
although the prosecuting States were not in a position to rely on their
treaty obligations as a basis for their prosecutions, the acts at issue
effectively were grave breaches.'
The U.S. Government's emphasis that the criminal violations amounted to
grave breaches, as opposed to a broader category of war crimes, highlights its
contention with Rule 156, "Definition of War Crimes," of the Study upon which
Rule 157 is reliant. The authors allege that Rule 156 lacks precision and is
therefore unreliable as a customary rule. They explain:
These acts include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
A[dditional] P[rotocol] I, other crimes prosecuted as 'war crimes' after
World War II and included in the Rome Statute, serious violations of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and several other acts
deemed 'war crimes' by 'customary law developed since 1977,' some of
which are included in the Rome Statute and some of which are not. 141
Rule 156 coupled with Rule 157 establish that certain serious violations of
humanitarian law constitute war crimes to which international criminal liability
inheres whether committed in international or non-international armed conflict.142
This is particularly troubling to the U.S., which has not ratified the Geneva
Convention's 1977 Additional Protocols.143 The Additional Protocols expand the
applicable scope of laws of war, and their attendant protections afforded to
civilians, combatants, prisoners, and the wounded, to those armed conflicts not of
an international character;144 they characterize wars of national liberation as
international in character;145 they reduce the stringent standards requisite upon
combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians;146 and they expand those
violations considered war crimes. 147
Whereas the ICRC includes these violations and others in its litany of war
crimes enumerated in Rule 156 over which third party states can establish criminal

140. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 11, at 469-70.
141. Id. at 466.
142. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 599-600 ("These violations are not listed in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court as war crimes. However, State practice recognizes their serious nature
and, as a result, a court would have sufficient basis to conclude that such acts in a non-international
armed conflict are war crimes.").
143. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P [hereinafter Protocol I];
see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflWebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P [hereinafter Protocol
Il].
144. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANIfARIAN LAW
IN WAR 129-31 (2010).
145. Protocol I, supranote 143, art. 1(4).
146. Id. art. 44(3).
147. SOLIS, supranote 144, at 123-30; see also Protocol I, supra note 143, art. 85(2)-(5).
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jurisdiction per Rule 157, the U.S. insists that those violations to which
international criminal liability is attached are limited to categories established by
treaty, which include, but are not limited to, grave breaches identified in the four
Geneva Conventions. The violations common to all four Geneva Conventions are
"willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health."l 48
As such, the U.S. objection to the ICRC analysis can be summarized: the
ICRC's evidence on state practice and opinio juris regarding the prosecution of
war crimes reflects inconsistent compliance with a treaty provision and is not
demonstrative of a new customary law. In order to examine whether the ICRC
correctly evaluated the customary status of the state right to vest national
legislation over universal jurisdiction for war crimes, I will divide my inquiry into
three broad categories: (1) Has an existing treaty provision found in several
multilateral treaties attained customary status and if so, is its customary form
distinct from its treaty articulation?; (2) How does, or does not, the state practice
and opiniojurisdocumented by the ICRC demonstrate the waning relevance of the
distinction between grave breaches and war crimes more generally?; and (3) What
do trends in state practice leading up to the ICRC's 2005 compendium of
customary international humanitarian law, as well as since the Study's completion,
indicate about the right to vest universal jurisdiction in national courts over war
crimes as a customary rule?
A. Treaty Provision versus Customary Rule
Customary law, a form of tacit consent, must be distinct from treaty law, a
form of explicit consent, in order to apply to non-party third states.149 The
customary rule need not be as precise as the treaty provision from which it
developed. Henckaerts agrees with this proposition and explains, "custom is not
like treaty law. It need not be stated verbatim and is therefore not incontrovertible.
The rule can be read more broadly." 50 He explains that Rule 157 suggests that
universal jurisdiction as captured in Rule 157 is a permissive right available to
states to try persons suspected of committing the war crimes enumerated in Rule
156 where a presence link to the prosecuting state is neither necessary nor
dispositive of the rule's existence.' 55

148. DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1047 (2010).

& DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND

149. See Simma, supra note 41, at 305 (stating that a binding treaty provision represents explicit
consent while customary law reflects tacit consent. For that reason, treaties are binding on contracting
parties only while custom is binding on all parties because of habitual conduct based on an objective
factual determination.).
150. Henckaerts Interview, supra note 128.
151. Id.; VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 605-06 ("Practice is not uniform with respect to whether the
principle of universal jurisdiction requires a particular link to the prosecuting State. The requirement
that some connection exist between the accused and the prosecuting State, in particular that the accused
be present in the territory or has fallen into the hands of the prosecuting State, is reflected in the military
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While the U.S. takes specific issue with Rule 157's non-definitive nature,
academic literature supports the notion that customary law cannot be as specific as
treaty law.1 52 Instead, it is observed as a general restatement that is molded by
judicial interpretation. As described by Professor Theodor Meron in his discussion
of the ICTY's Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6 case, "[c]ustomary law evolves through
interpretation and application. Here the science of the law blends with judicial
culture of caution and restraint." 53 Professor Schachter cautions that while all
rules can be made to conform with a particular outcome, it is wrong to assume that
they are without a core meaning.' 54
Despite its purported fluidity, the core meaning of Rule 157 is intact: states
have a right to try a suspect for a heinous offense committed abroad with no link to
another form of jurisdiction. This reflects, but is not identical to, the aut dedere
aut judicare principle captured in several multilateral treaties, which the Study
cites as evidence of state practice.' 5 That treaty provision arguably makes
prosecution a duty. In its earliest iteration, the principle of aut dedere autjudicare
only established an obligation to prosecute when a "request for extradition has
5
been received and denied."s'
A distinction can therefore be made between the
treaty rule mandating prosecution where extradition is requested and denied, and a
permissive rule, as 157 is meant to be, where no request has been made and a thirdparty state takes it upon itself to prosecute a crime on behalf of the international

manuals, legislation and case-law of many States. There is also legislation and case-law, however, that
does not require such a link. The Geneva Conventions do not require such a link either.").
152. See Hiram E. Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory oflnternationalLaw: The DistinctionBetween
Treaty and Customary Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973, 979-80 (1995) (explaining that treaties
are more conclusive, not universally binding); Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International
Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101, 104 (1987) ("Customary rules, however, are not static. They change in
content depending upon the amplitude of new vectors [i.e., state interests].").
153. Meron, supranote 59, at 826.
154. Schachter, supra note 110, at 119-20 (explaining that customary rules "are not free of
ambiguity and they may call for factual appraisals as to which reasonable persons can differ. One
cannot expect them to be applied by computers.").
155. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAw, VOLUME II: PRACTICE 3883-87 (2005) [hereinafter VOLUME II] (discussing
Article VI of the 1948 Genocide Convention; Article 49 of Geneva Convention I, Article 50 of Geneva
Convention II, Article 129 of Geneva Convention III, and Article 146 of Geneva Convention IV;
Article 28 of the 1948 Hague Convention; Article 85(1) of Additional Protocol I; Article 10 of the 1994
Convention on the Safety of UN Personnel; Article IV of the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons; Article 15(2) of the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons; Article 14 of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Chemical
Weapons; Article 9 of the 1997 Ottawa Convention; Preamble to the 1998 International Criminal Court
Statute; Article 12 of the International Criminal Court Statute; Article 13 of the 1998 International
Criminal Court Statute; and Article 16(1) of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention).
156. REYDAMS, supra note 45, at 44-45 (stating that this is in specific reference to Article 9 of the
International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency which mandates that the
"obligation to take proceedings is subject to the condition that extradition has been requested and that
the country to which application is made cannot hand over the person accused for some reason which
has no connection with the offence.").
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This distinction is deliberate and explicit, as evidenced by
community.
Henckaert's insistence that:
Rule 157 is not reflected anywhere in a treaty, unlike other rules, [it] has
not been codified, [and] there is no parallel in treaty law.

. .

. Since this

rule ... [is a] right, no one [will be] chided for failure to prosecute and
failure to legislate because it is only a right to do so.' 57
He continues that while there exists insufficient evidence to demonstrate that
there exists an obligation to prosecute, there is enough to demonstrate that there
exists a right to do so.' 58 This emphasizes the rule's permissive nature, which,
unlike other customary norms, is demonstrated by highlighting the lack of protest
to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
The Study's author explains that the number of cases brought by states
reflects this permissive right where there was no objection to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction even where no state expressed a desire to prosecute the
accused. 159 ICJ Judge Van der Wyngaert interprets the Lotus dictum in paragraphs
18-19 as supporting the concept of permissive rules in her dissenting opinion in
Arrest Warrant. The dictum declares that while states cannot exercise their
jurisdiction in another state, it does not follow that:
[I]nternational law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its
own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have
taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule
of international law .. .. Far from laying down a general prohibition to

the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and
the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their
territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion
which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards
other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it
160
regards as best and most suitable.
In her analysis, Van der Wyngaert distinguishes permissive and enforcement
jurisdiction. Whereas permissive jurisdiction is the right to establish jurisdiction to
try the crime, enforcement jurisdiction is the right to enforce that decision in
another state. She interprets the Lotus dictum as affording permissive jurisdiction
to State A to prosecute offenses committed in State B, but not to supplant the
judicial system in State B. While sovereignty precludes the exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction, she states "there is no prohibition under international law
to enact legislation allowing it to investigate and prosecute war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed abroad." 1 6 1

157. Henckaerts Interview, supra note 128.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 46 (Sept. 7).
161. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 1 51 (Feb. 14)
(Van Der Wyngaert, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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The U.S. also raises the issue of pure universal jurisdiction, or the right to
prosecute a suspect in absentia when a search within its territory produces no
results.162 It claims that state practice is insufficient to support the claim that
failure to demonstrate that pure universal jurisdiction has attained customary status
undermines the ICRC's findings. This objection, however, is arguably a red
herring given that the U.S. has not limited its protests to universal jurisdiction only
when it has been established in absentia.' 63 In fact, the issue of pure universal
jurisdiction is a distinct inquiry and has no bearing on the customary norm
articulated in Rule 157.
The ICRC's rule establishes that universal jurisdiction exists when no link
between the harm alleged and the forum state exists, regardless of the presence of
the accused in the forum state.'6 Presence of the accused within the forum state
does not undermine the meaning of universal jurisdiction, although it may put the
status of pure universal jurisdiction into question. Henckaerts clarifies that the
ICRC did not attach an element of absentia to the definitional scope of universal
jurisdiction. Instead, the principle represents "the lowest common denominator" of
a jurisdictional basis that is complementary to other bases of criminal jurisdiction
where a link to a forum state exists.'65 The ICRC thus negatively defines universal
jurisdiction as jurisdiction over a crime where no other basis of jurisdiction
exists.166
The ICRC's definition is not unique. The Institut de Droit International
("IDI") has also defined the jurisdiction as one unlike any existing basis for
jurisdiction for which the essence is an "absence of link between the crime and the
prosecuting State."' 67 "Mere presence," the IDI continues, does not "furnish such
a link." 68 Professor Theodor Meron agrees with this definition of universal
jurisdiction and explains:
There is no reason why universal jurisdiction should not also be
acknowledged in cases where the duty to prosecute and or extradite is
unclear, but the right to prosecute when offenses are committed by
aliens in foreign countries is recognized. Indeed, the true meaning of
universal jurisdiction is that international law permits any state to apply
162. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 11, at 466; see also Arrest Warrant 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,
31 (Feb. 14) (Higgins J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] different interpretation is given in the Pictet Commentary: Geneva Conventionfor the
Ameliorization on the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1952, which
contends that this obligation was understood as being an obligation upon States parties to search for
offenders who may be on their territory. Is it a true example of universality, if the obligation to search is
restricted to the own territory? Does the obligation to search imply a permission to prosecute in
absentia, if the search had no result?").
163. See discussion infra.
164. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 605-06.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 604-05.
167. Sienho Yee, UniversalJurisdiction:Concept, Logic, and Reality, 10 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 503,
505 (2011).
168. Id. at 514.
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its law to certain offenses even in the absence of territorial, nationality,
or other accepted contacts with the offender or the victim.169
Wolfgang Kaleck, a German human rights attorney responsible for bringing
several universal jurisdiction cases within European national courts-most notably
the 2004 case against Rumsfeld and company-attributes the presence requirement
to logistical purposes and not any restrictive rule upon states in their exercise of
universal jurisdiction. He comments:
[I]n the long run, it is difficult to start an investigation when there is no
link in the country. [This is b]ecause you have to work technically and
what can you do when there is no link at all . . . . With the presence

requirement that has to be enforced and has to be taken more seriously
by the government [which is necessary for the discovery process] so as a
policy goal we should adopt this practice to ensure success.170
Kaleck's observation highlights that while presence has become a technical
prerequisite domestically, it does not preclude a broader universality principle.' 7 1
However, the fact that other governments do not take a warrant seriously unless
presence is established also suggests that as the presence requirement develops as
an expectation among other states, it may become a requirement in customary
international law. The Joint Separate Opinion contemplates this possibility, but
insists that great care has been taken to avoid excluding other grounds of voluntary
jurisdiction during the drafting of relevant treaty provisions.' 72 They conclude that
as regards pure universal jurisdiction, state practice is neutral.' 7 3 Regardless, it is a
separate issue and does not have bearing on the ICRC's finding in Rule 157.
In its customary form, universal jurisdiction is a permissive right. Therefore,
its strength as a customary rule is derived from acquiescence among states to a
state's decision to exercise said jurisdiction. Additionally, while the presence
requirement has emerged as a domestic law requirement for the sake of logistics
and international comity, it neither precludes the exercise of a more pure universal
jurisdiction nor is it dispositive of a right to establish universal jurisdiction. These
factors help demonstrate the futility of the U.S.'s assertion that insufficient practice
169. Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554,
570 (1995) [hereinafter Meron Internal Atrocities].
170. Skype Interview with Wolfgang Kaleck, Human Rights Attorney (Nov. 6, 2011) [hereinafter
Kaleck Interview].
171. Id.; see also Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 155
(Feb. 14) (Van den Wyngaert, J., dissenting) (explaining that Justice Van den Wyngaert agrees and
attributes the requirement of the offender's presence in the exercise of universal jurisdiction to domestic
law, which is not necessarily an expression of opiniojurisrequired by international law. She explains
whereas presence may be required in domestic law, there is nothing in international law that similarly
makes it prerequisite.).
172. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 51 (Higgins, J., concurring) ("See Article 4 (3),
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Article 5 (3),
International Convention against Taking of Hostages, 1979; Article 5 (3), Convention against Torture;
Article 9, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and Article 19,
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.").
173. Id.145.
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of pure universal jurisdiction undermines its customary nature. As a permissive
rule, a principle's customary force is evidenced by the lack of protest to its
invocation. While the ICRC's determination that states have the right to vest
universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary right is sound, the same cannot be
said for its analysis on those heinous crimes to which international criminal
liability inheres.
B. Grave Breaches versus War Crimes
The universality principle in customary law encompasses a very broad
definition of war crimes that includes those violations of laws and customs of war
both in international ("IAC") and non-international armed conflict ("NIAC"). This
effectively collapses grave breaches, which can be committed only in IACs,174 with
a broader set of war crimes that can be committed in both international and noninternational conflict into a single category. The U.S. claims that those states
exercising universal jurisdiction are merely complying with the "extradite or
prosecute" treaty obligation pertaining to IACs. Accordingly, the prosecutable
crimes in those cases are limited to grave breaches with few exceptions. To
establish the veracity of Rule 157, the ICRC should be able to demonstrate either
the indistinguishable character of grave breaches and war crimes, and/or that state
practice sufficiently criminalizes war crimes in national legislation or
jurisprudence. In Henckaerts' words, "[i]f we only found support for grave
breaches that would not have been sufficient because it is a treaty obligation. So
we had to look for legislation that goes beyond grave breaches that gives the states
the right to vest national jurisdiction." 7 5
1. Distinct Legal Regimes
Grave breaches are defined in Geneva Convention Common Article
(50/51/130/147) as well as API Article 11 and 85.176 Historically, they have been
defined as "a limited set of particularly serious violations of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 that gave rise to special obligations of the States Parties for
the enactment and enforcement of domestic criminal law." 7 7 The travaux
prdparatoires of the Conventions demonstrate that state plenipotentiaries
deliberately distinguished the concept of grave breaches from war crimes in order
to ensure greater uniformity across states. Whereas war crimes had diverse

174. This takes for granted the U.S.'s objections to the inclusion of grave breaches listed under
Article 85(1) of Additional Protocol I, in particular its criminalization of offenses committed against
protected persons as listed in Article 44 of the Additional Protocol I. It also raises questions about the
nature of armed conflict listed in Article 1(4), which is also an unsettled area of law.
175. Henckaerts Interview, supra note 128.
176. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, How "Grave Breaches" are Defined in the Geneva
ConventionsandAdditional Protocols (last updated Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.icrc.org
/eng/resources/documents/mise/5zmgf9.htm.
177. Marko Divac Oberg, The Absorption of Grave Breaches into War Crimes, 91 INT'L. REV. RED
CROSS 163, 163 (2009).
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domestic meaning, a grave breach draws its meaning from international consensus
as enshrined in the Conventions and their Additional Protocols.' 78
Unlike war crimes to which international criminal liability inhered, grave
breaches necessitated national legislation to establish liability. The Conventions
considered these violations so serious that states had a treaty obligation to enact
penal legislation, prosecute, or extradite them.' 79 Non-grave breaches of the
Conventions are sanctioned in national law by discretion. They amount to war
crimes if they are serious enough.
Significantly, Article 85(5) of Additional Protocol I described grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols as war crimes,' 80
thereby attaching to grave breaches criminal consequences in international law.' 8'
Among the reasons for maintaining a distinction between the treaty provision and
customary law, however, is that within the confines of domestic law, states are not
obligated to prosecute war crimes but have a duty to prosecute or hand over a
person accused of a grave breach. 182 In his comprehensive article on the matter,
Marko Divac Oberg argues that thirty years since the legislation of the concept of
grave breaches, the "war crimes concept is the more dynamic of the two, to the
point that one may wonder whether grave breaches will disappear from
Nonetheless, he continues, "[t]oday, grave breaches
international law."' 83
provisions, at least those of the 1949 generation, remains privileged as tried and
true black-letter law, compared with the nebulous customary law origins of war
crimes."' 84
The preference for the black-letter character of grave breaches is evidenced in
the jurisprudence and law of international criminal tribunals as well. Consider that
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda ("ICTR") does not
make mention of grave breaches because of the uncontested nature of the Rwandan
conflict as one of a non-international character.'85 The Statute establishes that
prosecutable crimes include crimes against humanity, genocide, and violations of
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, but
not grave breaches.' 86
In contrast, the dissolution of the Yugoslav Republic and the attendant state
and non-state violence meted out within and between the various ethnic groups and
nascent states characterized the conflict as both international and non-international.
178. Id. at 165-66.
179. Id. at 165.
180. Protocol I, supra note 143, art. 85(5) ("Without prejudice to the application of the
Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war
crimes.").
181. Oberg, supra note 177, at 167.
182. Id. at 181.
183. Id. at 164.
184. Id. at 182.
185. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
186. See id. arts. 2-4.
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Accordingly, the Statute of the ICTY'17 includes both grave breaches and war
crimes as possible offenses. It also distinguishes grave breaches from war crimes
in Article 2 and Article 3 respectively.' 88
In Prosecutorv. Tadic,'89 the Appeals Chamber went to painstaking efforts to
characterize the conflict as an IAC, and therefore prosecute the defendant under
Article 2 grave breaches.190 To do so, it had to distinguish its legal reasoning from
the ICJ's findings in Nicaragua where it applied the "effective control" test to
determine whether or not U.S. intervention made the conflict tantamount to an
IAC.191 The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred "in so far as it
acquitted the Appellant on the sole ground that the grave breaches regime of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not apply,"' 92 and held Tadic to be guilty of
grave breaches.' 93
Significantly, in the series of cases that followed, the ICTY abandoned this
practice and analyzed the violations under a NIAC legal regime. The strategic
shift reflected a desire to pursue a less cumbersome approach to establishing
liability for war crimes. Justice Richard Goldstone, who served as the ICTY's first
chief prosecutor, explained that after the appeals decision, the court no longer
referred to grave breaches. Instead, it charged defendants with ordinary war crimes
which apply to international and non-international armed conflicts. Further, the
court had the additional obligation and burden to demonstrate that an international
armed conflict existed.194 Using an Article 3 analysis, the ICTY established
liability for both grave breaches and war crimes. On the one hand, this affirms that
the distinct legal regimes between international and non-international armed
conflict is of enduring relevance. On the other, it also highlights how grave

187. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Sep. 2009),
availableat http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute sept09_en.pdf.
188. Id. arts. 2-3.
189. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, 11 84, 115, 170
(July 15, 1999).
190. Id. 84 ("It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two
or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State,
it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character
alongside an internal armed conflict) if(i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or
alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other
State.").
191. Id. 115 ("The 'effective control' test enunciated by the International Court of Justice was
regarded as correct and upheld by Trial Chamber II in the Judgment. The Appeals Chamber, with
respect, does not hold the Nicaragua test to be persuasive. There are two grounds supporting this
conclusion."); see also id. 1 124 ("The 'effective control' test propounded by the International Court of
Justice as an exclusive and all-embracing test is at variance with international judicial and State
practice: such practice has envisaged State responsibility in circumstances where a lower degree of
control than that demanded by the Nicaragua test was exercised.").
192. Id. T 170.
193. Id. T 171.
194. Telephone Interview with Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia (Nov. 9, 2011).
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breaches can be subsumed by a broader category of war crimes thereby
diminishing the demarcation between the distinct war crimes categories.
A U.S. amendment to its penal code defining war crimes also contributes to
this steady evisceration process. In 2006, U.S. lawmakers amended 18 U.S.C. §
2441 and defined certain violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions as grave breaches. 195 This is striking since the violations listed in the
Common Article do not amount to grave breaches under the Conventions as grave
breaches are defined only in IACs, and Common Article 3 applies only in NIACs.
Additionally, those prohibitions listed in the U.S. Code include torture, cruel or
inhuman treatment, performing biological experiments, murder, mutilating or
maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, rape, sexual assault or abuse,
and taking hostages,19 and are therefore broader than the list of grave breaches
common to the four Geneva Conventions.1 9 7 It is not clear why the U.S. would
object to the inclusion of other war crimes committed in NIAC as grave breaches
but redefine the aforementioned crimes as grave breaches in its domestic law.198
Regardless, the U.S. state practice arguably contributes to the waning relevance of
the distinction between war crimes established by treaty and those established by
custom.
Notwithstanding these interesting developments, grave breaches continue to
constitute a distinct legal regime that is not easily collapsed with a broader
category of war crimes because of the nuances within the 1949 and 1977
generations of grave breaches. Consider the establishment of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC"). The Rome Statute distinguishes between war crimes,
Article 8(2)(b), and grave breaches, Article 8(2)(a).' 99 Though the inclusion of all
grave breaches as war crimes indicates an acceptance that grave breaches can exist
outside of the strict confines of IAC, the distinction between those grave breaches
remains a matter of controversy. Of particular note is the fact that the drafters
included grave breaches pursuant to Additional Protocol I under the war crimes
section rather than the section listing grave breaches. 200 Indeed, this categorization
demonstrates the enduring objections to the Additional Protocols as controlling law
and, similarly, the outstanding distinctions between grave breaches and war
195. See War Crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) ("(c)(3) which constitutes a grave breach of
common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d)) when committed in the context of and in association
with an armed conflict of an international character.").
196. Id. § 2441(d).
197. LUBAN ET AL., supra note 148 (listing the grave breaches common to the four Geneva
Conventions as: "willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health").
198. See R. Jeffrey Smith, War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce Threat Of Prosecution, WASH.
POST, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/08/AR200608080
1276.html; see also Bellinger & Haynes, supranote 11, at 443. It is of note that Congress amended the
federal law in 2006 in an effort to retroactively protect U.S. soldiers from liability whereas the
Government drafted its response to the ICRC in 2005.
199. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,
1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
200. Oberg, supra note 177, at 167.
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crimes. Still, a strong argument can be made that certain practices, including U.S.
national legislation and ICTY jurisprudence, constitute trends indicative of a
fading distinction between the two categories.

2. National Legislation and Jurisprudence
While wholly reasonable to draft a customary rule characterized by ambiguity
to be shaped by judicial tribunals and academics, the distinction between grave
breaches and war crimes merited more discrete treatment in the 2005 Study. The
ICRC does not demonstrate how its evidence of state practice makes the
distinctions between the two categories irrelevant. Contrary to the U.S.'s
contention that the national legislation does not suffice to demonstrate opiniojuris
in support of Rule 157, the legislation is demonstrative of opiniojuris as well as
state practice.
The problem, however, is that the national legislation cited is vast,
encompassing both narrow jurisdiction over grave breaches pursuant to an existing
treaty obligation as well as broad jurisdiction over crimes irrespective of their
character as a grave breach or a general war crime. The spectrum of criminal
categories includes ordinary crimes, such as murder, rape assault and abduction;
and, certain crimes under international law such as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and torture.201 Moreover, the overwhelming majority of
examples cited in the Study refer only to jurisdiction over grave breaches or crimes
otherwise established in treaty law.202 Only a handful of states have statutes with
broad application. 203 Belarus is one such state and its statute reads:
The Criminal Code of Belarus [1999] provides for universal jurisdiction
for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, the use of
prohibited means and methods of warfare, violations of the laws and
customs of war and grave breaches of IHL, which are included in the

special section of the Code, as well as for offences under treaties to
which Belarus is a party.204
Jurisprudence evidencing an indistinguishable approach to war crimes
irrespective of their treaty or customary nature can suffice to disregard the
distinctions made between them in national legislation. The ICRC cites thirty-one
cases where universal jurisdiction was invoked, as demonstrated in the chart
below, listing national case law as evidence of state practice. Of those, only twelve
involved claims for violations of laws and customs of war beyond the scope of

201. See JUSTICE TOOL, supra note 131, at 12.
202. See generally VOLUME I, supra note 155, at 3888-3912.

203. Id. at 3896, 3904-3911 (Belarus, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom).
204. Id. at 3896.
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grave breaches. 205 Notably, twenty of all listed cases involved cases emerging
from World War II, the conflict in Yugoslavia, and the conflict in Rwanda.206
STAE (YEAR)

CRIME (lAC OR NIAC)

Belgium (2001)

Grave breaches, and AP II
and CA3 (NIAC)

DjajiM

Germany (1997)

Kusljik

Germany (1997)
Germany (1999)

Geneva Convention ("GC")
and grave breaches regime
OC, Genocide (IAC)
Tried Bosnian nationals for
grave breaches art. 146 and
147 of GC IV

Sokolovik
Javor

Germany (1999)
France (1996)

Manyeshyaka

France (1996)

Prosecution of a Rwandan I
priest accused of an alleged
role for massacres in Kigali.
Court of Cassation overruled
lack
of
for
dismissal
jurisdiction citing that France
was obligated to try persons
pursuant
to
Law
of
Cooperation with the ICTR

Grabel

Switzerland
(1997)
Switzerland
(1999)

GCIII, GCIV,

CASE

The Four
Batare

from

Grave breaches regime (IAC)
Dismissed case for lack of
treaty obligation or link to
France

1996 (NIAC)

Niyonteze

Musema

Switzerland
(1997)

Eicbmana
Demjanjuk

Israel (1961)
U.S. (1985)_

API, APII,

customary war crimes

National crimes, did not
recognize
genocide
and
crimes against humanity
(NIAC)
Agreed to surrender detainee
of Rwandan nationality to
ICTR (NIAC
__

G~ustomnary lw
Affirmed Israel's right to try
accused

205. Id. at 3913-26 (Pinochet, Demjanjuk, Niyonteze, Musema, Grabe2, Hiss6ne Haber6, Knesevid,
Eichmann, Kusljid, Munyeshyaka, Four from Butare, and Cvjetokovic).
206. Id. at 3913-26 (Rwanda: Four from Butare, Niyonteze, Munyeshyaka, Musema; Yugoslavia:
Sarid, Javor, Djajid, Jorgid, Sokolovid, Kusljid, Knesevid, Grabe2; WWII: Demjanjuk, Altstdtter,
Sawoniuk, Kuroda, Rohrig and Others, Ahlbrecht, Eichmann, Finta, Polyukhovich).
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Yousef

Altstitter
Justice Trial)

U.S. (2003)

(The

U.S. (1947)

Sark

Denmark (1994)

Rohrig and Others

Netherlands
(1950)

"Ahlbrecht

Netherlands
(1947)

Knesevi

Netherlands
(1997)

Sawoniuk

UIK (1999)

Pinochet

Einta

UK (1999)
Canada (1989)

Polyukhovich

Australia (1991)

Cvjetkovi
Schwammberger

Austria (1994)
Argentina
(1989)
Mexico (2001)

Cavallo extradition

case
Kuroda
Hisskne Haber6

Phillippines
(1949)
Senegal

VOL. 41: 2

Dismissed suit, terrorism not
customary, no basis for
universal jurisdiction C'JJD
U.S. Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg affirmed validity
of universality principle
GCIII and GC IV,
rture
Upheld
jurisdiction
established in Ahlbrecht by
way of amendment
Wrcrimes and crms
against Humanity comm
during WWII
J
Bosnian Serbs, interpreted
Art. 3 of the Act to give
Dutch courts competence to
try war crimes (including
grave breaches andCA3)
UK War Crimes Act of 1991,
.1tmtorial link---......
Torture,.us cogens
WWII, war crimes and crimes
aga inst hum-anity
..._IC
_j
Customary
war
crimes,
iWWII, IAC
Art. 6 Genocide Convention
Genocide
Obliged to comply with
extradition request by Spain
& based principle on US
J
WWII, prosecute Japanese in
the Philippines

Dismissed
for lack of
jurisdiction, internal conflict

These cases certainly demonstrate that there is general support for a
jurisdiction to try persons even in the absence of a traditional link to the forum
state. They do not demonstrate, however, that such jurisdiction extends to a broad
category of war crimes as captured by Rule 157. State practice seems to indicate a
willingness by states to prosecute those crimes, which are considered an affront to
humanity in toto. However, it is inescapable that such broad condemnation is only
established in cases where the international community has articulated its
collective approbation through the U.N. Security Council, (i.e., ICTY, ICTR) or
atop the platform afforded to victors of war (i.e., Nuremberg, Tokyo). As such, it
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may have been more appropriate to find that universal jurisdiction exists as a
customary right over those crimes condemned by the international community
regardless of their treaty- or customary-based status.
i. Broader Political Context: Trends before 2005
The ICRC's enthusiasm to find that states have the right to vest universal
jurisdiction in their national legislation over war crimes is understandable in light
of the political context at the time of writing. The establishment of the ICTY in
1993, the ICTR in 1994, and the ICC in 2002 marks a dramatic acceleration of
international criminal law's development, unseen since the criminal tribunals
following the Second World War.207 The "atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda shocked the conscience of the people everywhere, triggering within a
short space of time, several major legal developments," namely the promulgation
of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes under Chapter VII authority as well as the adoption
of a treaty-based statute for an International Law Commission.208 The indelible
impact of the tribunals and the ICC on the ICRC is evidenced by their reference in
the Study more than 170 times before the Study began its treatment of
implementation and enforcement of humanitarian law.209
Notwithstanding the decade's unprecedented events, a few notable gaps
undermine the ICRC's analysis. Namely, the Study failed to assess properly the
impact of the ICJ's Arrest Warrant decision and the impact of universal
jurisdiction cases against United States officials in Belgium and Germany,
respectively, prior to 2005.
a. Arrest Warrant (DemocraticRepublic of the Congo v.
Belgium)
In 2000, a Belgian investigating magistrate issued an arrest warrant in
absentia to Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombsai, an incumbent Foreign Affairs Minister of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The warrant alleged that he had committed
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols as well
as crimes against humanity. In response, the Congo brought suit against Belgium
in the ICJ challenging the arrest warrant's validity. The ICJ restricted its analysis
to the immunity due to acting state officials and ruled in favor of the Congo. In a
10-6 vote, the ICJ held that the warrant against Yerodia "failed to respect the
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo enjoyed under international law; and that
207. See Oberg, supra note 177, at 182; Meron Internal Atrocities, supra note 169, at 568.
Universal jurisdiction developed post-WWII when most violations were prosecuted in international
tribunals and courts of the occupying powers of Germany. Most violations were tried in the courts of
various Allied States though they were not required to do so by international law at the time. The crimes
tried were not even characterized as crimes by any general international treaty at the time. Id.
208. Meron Internal Atrocities, supranote 169, at 554.
209. Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars, and the Gavel: The Influence of the
InternationalCriminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLIcT & SECURTY L.
239,240 (2006).
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Belgium must cancel the arrest warrant." 210 The Court found that customary
international law of immunities is meant to ensure the effective performance of
state officials on behalf of their respective states. The decision was careful to
distinguish the concept of juridical immunity from suit from impunity for crimes
thereby preserving the possibility that Yerodia can be tried after completing his
term in office. While the 2002 ICJ decision did not diminish the legitimacy of
universal jurisdiction, it arguably had a chilling effect on its invocation. Consider
that the Court's decision, which affirmed the immunity for heads of state
regardless of their alleged crimes, indicates cautionary restraint. 211 In effect, the
Arrest Warrant case worked to resuscitate a discussion of universal jurisdiction's
legitimacy, which was taken for granted until then. The Study notes the case in its
compendium of state practice, and concludes that nothing in the decision impacts
universal jurisdiction's standing as a customary rule. 212 This is odd given that the
case's chilling effect also impacts what states deem legally permissible and
obligatory. At minimum, the ICJ decision informs the scope of universal
jurisdiction, which is arguably more limited than is indicated by Rule 157.
b. Belgium
In 1993, Belgium enacted a law to prosecute grave breaches pursuant to the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. In 1999, it strengthened the
law and expanded it to include genocide and crimes against humanity, even for
sitting heads of state.213 Under Belgian rules, like other civil law countries, private
persons can file criminal complaints with the public prosecutor, which the
prosecutor must investigate.214 While the Belgian Prime Minister supported the
law when the Court of Cassation held that it can be invoked against an accused in
absentia,215 he did not have the same reaction when plaintiffs brought suit against
U.S. officials.
In March 2003, seven Iraqi families filed a criminal case against George Bush
and members of his Administration for war crimes stemming from the deaths of

210. Press Release, International Court of Justice, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Beig.), I.C.J. Press Release 2002/4 (Feb.14, 2002), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?pr-552&code=cobe&pl=3&p2=3&p3=6&case=121&k-36.
211. See Yee, supra note 167, at 530 ("The movement for 'pure universal jurisdiction' has been
'trending down' since the conspicuous silence of the ICJ on the legitimacy of that jurisdiction in the
Arrest Warrant case .. . . The subsequent downtrend may have been in no small measure due to the
cautious judgment of that case.").
212. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 606 ("The judgment of the International Court of Justice turned on
the question of immunity of heads of State and foreign ministers and therefore no decision was taken on
the extent of universal jurisdiction ... but the majority did not contest the right to try to a suspected war
criminal on the basis of universal jurisdiction.").
213. Stephen R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 888, 891
(2003).
214. Id. at 890.
215. Id. at 889-90 (referring to the Court of Cassation decision against Ariel Sharon and Yaron
Almog for their role in a 1982 attack on a Beirut-based Palestinian refugee camp that resulted in the
death of approximately 1,000 civilians).
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dozens of Iraqi civilians killed when a U.S. missile penetrated a Baghdad bomb
shelter in 1991.216 The U.S. threatened to relocate NATO headquarters from
Brussels if Belgium did not terminate its proceedings. Prime Minister Verhofstadt
responded promptly and in April 2003, Belgian parliament amended its law. The
amendments significantly reduced the scope of universal jurisdiction by (1)
requiring passive or active personality jurisdiction; (2) providing immunity to all
acting state officials as well as for all persons on official visits; and (3) restricting
the ability to bring suit to prosecutors and not civilians. 217 The amendments left
Belgian courts available for human rights cases when (1) the requisite tie to
Belgium existed; (2) the other states with links to the crime lacked the capacity to
try the cases; and (3) the accused has no immunity. 218 Notably the law's new
criteria, that there exist a link between the crime and Belgium, undermine its
character as universal jurisdiction even under its broad definition as a negative
rule.
c. Germany
In 2004, the Center for Constitutional Rights, along with several cooperating
attorneys including Wolfgang Kaleck, filed a case against Donald H. Rumsfeld,
then U.S. Secretary of Defense and other U.S. officials, citing mistreatment of
detainees at Abu Ghraib and other detention locations in Iraq. 219 Plaintiffs'
attorneys explained that German courts treated the complaint seriously until midJanuary when news of Rumsfeld's imminent visit to Germany sparked public
debate. Rumsfeld threatened to cancel his trip unless German authorities revoked
the warrant.220 Two days before Rumsfeld arrival in Germany for an international
security conference, a German court dismissed the case on grounds of
complementarity. The prosecutor held that there was no indication that the U.S.
would not investigate and prosecute said abuses. 221 Germany's dismissal of the
case on political grounds was readily apparent to everyone involved. As put by
Kaleck:
[The warrant] really molested the U.S. and this was communicated to
the Germans.. . . It was kind of naive of us, and still kind of naive on
the part of the human rights movement, if you deal with such cases you
have to deal with politics. Whereas human rights organizations try to

pretend that they do not have to deal with politics-you have to deal
with politics and [the] reality of power politics to bring such cases, you
are not in a powerless legal sphere. 222
216. Laurie King-Irani, Does Universal Jurisdiction Have a Local Address? Lessons from the
Belgian Experiment, 229 MIDDLE E. REP. 20, 23-24 (Winter 2003).

217. Ratner, supranote 213, at 891.
218. Id.
219. MAximo Langer, The Diplomacy of UniversalJurisdiction: The Role of PoliticalBranches in
the TransnationalProsecution ofInternationalCrimes, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2011).

220. Kaleck Interview, supra note 170.
221. Id.

222. Id.
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Notably, Kaleck and cooperating attorneys attempted to revive the criminal
suit in subsequent years in Germany, as well as France. Both were dismissed on
similar grounds. Applying the ICRC's own test for identifying the existence of a
permissive rule, the protests by the U.S. and the Congo over the application of
universal jurisdiction should have raised concerns for the ICRC. Buoyed by a
decade rife with contrary evidence, the ICRC may have predicted that the trend,
however mired, pointed towards more robust practice. However, in 2011, it is
plainly clear that the Arrest Warrant case, coupled with the U.S.'s indelible
reprimand of those states who dared to challenge its behavior, have had a
regressive impact on the application of universal jurisdiction.
ii. Broader Political Context: Trends between 2005 and 2011
Since 2005, Germany and other states have invoked universal jurisdiction to
challenge the behavior of powerful states including the U.S., Israel, and China,
eliciting fervent protest by those states. The protests translated into meaningful
political pressure resulting in the termination of the cases as well as amendment of
universal jurisdiction laws. The regressive trend generally resulted in attenuated
universal jurisdiction over crimes across several states. These measures serve as
evidence of opiniojuris and state practice, derived from a single act, and informs
the status of the customary right to vest universal jurisdiction in national courts.
Consider the following cases in Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom,
as well as proceedings within the Sixth of Committee of the U.N. General
Assembly ("Sixth Committee").
a. Germany
In 2006, the U.S. passed the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), which
retroactively grants immunity to everyone involved in the enhanced interrogation
techniques.223 Kaleck, along with the Center for Constitutional Rights, revived the
criminal complaints against Donald Rumsfeld, as well as U.S. Attorney General
Gonzalez, John Yoo, and others "accused as the alleged legal 'architects' of the
torture program" on the basis that the U.S. has shown itself unable and unwilling to
investigate and prosecute.224 The new complaint included more evidence and
detail. 225 Significantly, the attorneys filed it after the resignation of Secretary
223. German War Crimes Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld, et al., CTR. CONST. RTS.,

http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/german-war-crimes-complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld,-etal [hereinafter CCR] (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
224. Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: UniversalJurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008,
30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 953 (2009).
225. CCR, supra note 223 ("The complaint is being filed under the Code of Crimes against
International Law ("CCIL"), enacted by Germany in compliance with the Rome Statute creating the
International Criminal Court in 2002, which Germany ratified. The CCLL provides for "universal
jurisdiction" for war crimes, crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. It enables the German
Federal Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute crimes constituting a violation of the CCLL, irrespective
of the location of the defendant or plaintiff, the place where the crime was carried out, or the nationality
of the persons involved. No international courts or personal tribunals in Iraq were mandated to conduct
investigations and prosecutions of responsible U.S. officials. The United States has refused to join the
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Rumsfeld from the helm of the Department of Defense. 226 The German prosecutor
dismissed the case in 2007. Citing the Code of Criminal Procedure, he claimed
that there was no "legitimizing [domestic] link[age]" to justify German universal
jurisdiction over crimes committed extraterritorially and, therefore, there "was not
a reasonable likelihood of convicting the suspect in Germany." 227 A group of
human rights organizations filed several appeals all to no avail. On April 21, 2009,
the Appeal Court Stuttgart issued the final dismissal citing the appeal as
"inadmissible." 228
b. France
Following the German prosecutor's 2007 dismissal of the revived criminal
complaint, a French attorney, together with the same group of human rights
organizations, filed a criminal complaint against Rumsfeld in France during his
private visit in October 2007.229 The complaint alleged torture and inhumane
treatment of detainees in U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib. 230 The French Public Prosecutor refused to proceed, on the ground that
Rumsfeld was immune under the Arrest Warrant case.231
In a letter, the French prosecutor explained that under the Arrest Warrant
case, officials of high rank, such as the Head of State, enjoy immunities from
criminal and civil jurisdiction in other states during the exercise of their
232
functions.
Although such head of state immunity ceases upon completion of the
accused's official function, the prosecutor carefully notes that this is only the case
for "acts accomplished before or after the period during which the protected person
was occupying his/her post or for acts that, although accomplished during this
period, are not related to the functions carried out." 233 Therefore, the charges
against Rumsfeld cannot be "dissociated from his functions" while he was the
Secretary of Defense.234 The prosecutor notes that unlike Pinochet, Rumsfeld's
International Criminal Court, thereby foreclosing the option of pursuing a prosecution before it. Iraq
has no authority to prosecute. Furthermore, the U.S. gave immunity to all its personnel in Iraq from
Iraqi prosecution. All this added to the United States' unquestionable refusal to look at the
responsibility of those of the very top of the chain of command and named in the present complaint, and
the recent passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 . . . aimed at preventing war crimes
prosecutions against Americans in the U.S., German courts are seen as a last resort to obtain justice for
those victims of abuse and torture while detained by the United States.").
226. Id.
227. Kaleck, supra note 224, at 949, 953.
228. Rumsfeld Torture Cases-Criminal Charges Filed, EUR. CTR. CONST. & HUM. RTs.,
http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/us accountability/articles/complaint-against-former-us-secretary-ofdefense-donald-rumsfeld.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
229. Id.
230. Id. (noting the memo signed by Rumsfeld of enhanced interrogation techniques).
23 1. Letter from Public Prosecutor (ProcureurGindral)to the Paris Court of Appeal to Patrick
Baudouin (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/RumsfeldFrenchCase_%20Prosecu
tors%20Decision 02_08.pdf.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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actions were not marginal to the exercise of his functions as the Secretary of
Defense.235 Moreover, the gravity of those alleged offenses has no bearing upon
official immunity so long as they are central, and not marginal, to the exercise of
his official functions.236 The French prosecutor's judgment significantly truncates
both the scope of universal jurisdiction as well as the scope of prosecutable
offenses based on Head of State immunity.
c. Spain
Spain arguably led the enthusiastic charge of universal jurisdiction's potential
benefits when it issued an arrest warrant for Chile's Augusto Pinochet, delivered
by the United Kingdom, in 1998.233 The extradition never came to fruition as the
U.K. cancelled the extradition proceedings against Pinochet on humanitarian
grounds in 2000. Thereafter, the tide against universal jurisdiction in Spain
accelerated in the face of mounting cases filed against Guatemalans and
Argentineans under its universal jurisdiction statute.2 3 8 Although the Spanish
Supreme Court initially required that there exist a procedural link to national
interest to establish universal jurisdiction, in 2005, the Constitutional Tribunal
overruled this analysis. Instead, it held that "a link to national interest [was] not
required since universal jurisdiction is exclusively based on the substantive nature
of grave crimes affecting the entire international community." 239 This robust
authority constricted rapidly under intense political pressure when Spain filed
criminal suits against Chinese, Israeli, and U.S. officials between 2003 and
2009.240 In all three cases, the affected home countries protested that Spain's
jurisdiction amounted to intervention into the states' internal affairs. 24' Spanish
courts dismissed the cases for complementarity. 242
The Spanish case against three American soldiers for the death of a Spanish
journalist in Iraq is of particular note. The Spanish magistrate asserted that the
soldiers must have known that the hotel was located in a civilian area occupied
only by journalists.243 The U.S. refused to cooperate with the investigation. A
State Department spokesperson stated that "it will be a 'very cold day in hell,'
before American soldiers have to answer to Spanish courts." 244 Other Spanish
cases sought to investigate whether Spain violated its obligations by allowing U.S.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Langer, supranote 219, at 4.
238. Mugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded UniversalJurisdictionto ProsecuteHuman Rights Abuses
in Latin America, China, andBeyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 495, 496-97 (2007) (explaining that
Spanish courts successfully prosecuted Guatemalan generals for genocide, torture and state sponsored
terrorism against the Mayan people between 1978 and 1986, and has also successfully prosecuted
Argentineans during the "Dirty War").
239. Id. at 510.
240. Langer, supranote 219, at 37-40.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Jouet, supra note 238, at 526.
244. Id. at 527.
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planes to travel through Spain on their way to Guantanamo Bay or for CIA
operatives who traveled through Spain during extraordinary rendition flights. 245
WikiLeaks cables revealed that the U.S. placed extraordinary pressure upon
Spanish courts and judges to drop the case. 246 Universal jurisdiction came to a halt
when the investigating magistrate, Baltasar Garz6n, indicated that he would
investigate alleged violations by Spanish authorities against Basque separatists.
The Spanish courts then accused Garz6n of overstepping his judicial authority,
which constitutes a criminal offense in Spain, thereby ending his decades-long
career as a prosecutor. 24 7 Spanish courts dismissed the cases on grounds of
complementarity in 2011.
The cases, and the diplomatic furor they created, also prompted radical
amendment to Spain's universal jurisdiction law. In 2009, Spanish legislators
amended the law to require that either the accused be in Spanish territory or that
there exist another relevant link between Spain and the case. The new law also
prohibited Spanish courts from invoking universal jurisdiction if another national
court or an international tribunal is investigating the case. 248
d. United Kingdom
After a series of cases brought against former Israeli officials in the British
courts, 249 its Parliament amended the U.K. law to prohibit magistrates from filing

245. Giles Tremlett, Wikileaks: US PressuredSpain Over CIA Rendition and Guantdnamo Torture,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-usspain-guantanamo-rendition; US Embassy Cables: Spanish Prosecutor Weighs Guantdnamo Criminal
Against US Officials, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/usembassy-cables-documents/200177.
246. Tremlett, supra note 245 ("Senator Mel Martinez, a former Republican party chairman, and
the U.S. embassy's charge d'affaires visited the Spanish foreign ministry to wam the investigation
would have consequences." The U.S. targeted various judges and prosecutors including national court
chief prosecutor, Javier Zaragoza. The WikiLeaks cable shows that Zaragoza was a valuable asset to
the U.S. government in trying to stop investigations by Prosecutor Garz6n who was responsible for the
majority of prosecutions under universal jurisdiction in Spanish courts. Zaragoza criticized Garz6n as
hating Americans and seemed to provide the U.S. government with information that Garz6n was
already under scrutiny for "his investigation into human rights crimes committed under Spain's former
dictator General Francisco Franco."); see also Scott Horton, The Madrid Cables, HARPER'S MAG.: THE
STREAM, (Dec. 1, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://harpers.org/archive/2010/12/hbc-90007836. According to
Harper's Magazine, the WikiLeaks cables also showed the U.S. embassy in Madrid was also involved
in political pressure against Spanish courts. "These cables show that the U.S. embassy in Madrid had far
exceeded this mandate, however, and was actually successfully steering the course of criminal
investigations, the selection of judges, and the conduct of prosecutors. Their disclosure has created
deep concern about the independence of judges in Spain and the manipulation of the entire criminal
justice system by a foreign power." Id.
247. See Lisa Abend, Sentencing Spain's 'Superiudge': Why Baltasar Garzdn is Being Punished,
TIME, Feb. 10, 2012, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2106537,00.html.
248. Langer, supra note 219, at 40 (explaining amended Article 23(4)).
249. Noura Erakat, Israel versus Universal Jurisdiction:A Battle for InternationalHuman Rights
Law, JADALIYYA (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/288/israel-versus-universaljurisdiction a-battle-for-.
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arrest warrants for universal jurisdiction cases.250 Since the 2011 amendments
went into effect, only a government minister can authorize an arrest warrant.251
While the amendment further politicizes invocation of universal jurisdiction, it still
preserves that states have the permissive right to do so.
e. African Union Challenge in the Sixth Committee
In light of the failed suits against U.S., Israeli, and Chinese officials, African
countries-which have borne the brunt of international criminal law's
development252 and therefore, are specially affected-challenged the application of
universal jurisdiction. In February 2009, Tanzania, on behalf of the Group of
African States, requested the inclusion of an additional agenda item titled "abuse
of the principle of universal jurisdiction" in the proceedings of the 6 3 d Session of
the United Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly adopted resolution
A/RES/64/117 and mandated (1) that all states submit reports on their scope and
application of universal jurisdiction to the Secretary-General by April 2010; and
(2) that the Sixth Committee (legal) would consider the issue as part of its
discussions on pressing legal issues.253 While the response to the SecretaryGeneral has been underwhelming, universal jurisdiction has been the subject of
heated debate since 2009.254
Of the 192 member states asked to submit reports to the Secretary-General,
In its 2010 report on Universal
only forty-four states have complied.255
Jurisdiction, Amnesty International demonstrates a gap between the state
submissions to the Secretary-General and their actual practice and legislation. The
international NGO shows that states knowingly withheld information critical for an
authoritative and comprehensive assessment of universal jurisdiction.256 While
this may illustrate shortcomings in the Secretary-General's assessment of the
practice, it does not bode well for the status of universal jurisdiction. The
lackluster and inaccurate submissions may constitute a state practice unto their
own demonstrating a regression away from the robust potential of universal
jurisdiction as a tool to end impunity.

250. Danna Harman, U.K. Moves to Amend UniversalJurisdictionLaw, HAARETZ (Feb. 12, 2010,
1:33 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/u-k-moves-to-amend-universal-jurisdiction-law1.328308.
251. Jonny Paul, U.K. Amends Laws to Protect Israelisfrom Prosecution, THE JERUSALEM POST
(Sep. 15, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=238107.
252. See generally Situations & Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/ENMenus/ICC

(last visited Dec. 2, 2012)
/Situations%2Oand%2OCases/Pages/situations%2Oand%20cases.aspx
(pointing out that of the ICC warrants issued since the tribunal's establishment in 2002, all of them have
involved cases emerging from the African continent). Not a single universal jurisdiction case has been
invoked in an African national court. See Yee, supranote 167, at 522.
253. JUSTICE TOOL, supra note 131, at 5-6.
254. See Yee, supra note 167, at 503.
255. JUSTICE TOOL, supra note 131, at 5.
256. Id.
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Within the Sixth Committee, divergent understandings of universal
jurisdiction have done little to afford clarity on the matter. 257 It is of considerable
significance, however, that not a single state among those who participated in the
Sixth Committee discussion questioned the permissible right of universal
jurisdiction. In the most recent Sixth Committee meeting in October 2011,
participating member states repeatedly and consistently affirmed the critical need
for a universal jurisdiction for the sake of a world where the torturer could find no
haven, but lamented the lack of a more formulaic approach that would offer
predictability. 258 They are primarily concerned with the fact that the tool had
gotten into the hands of individuals, of civil society organizations, and other nonstate actors. Absent tight regulation, these actions could not be filtered to account
for comity.259 This narrative suited those strong states that feared that universal
jurisdiction would become a pathway for the individual to become a full rightsbearing agent under international law. On the other hand, weaker states grew
frustrated that such a jurisdiction would only be wielded against the sovereignty of
the least-developed states for which sovereignty was tenuous.260 All parties
describe the problem as the "politicization" of universal jurisdiction.26 1
While clarity on the definition of universal jurisdiction will not trump the
practice itself, or its availability as customary permissive right, inter-subjective
confusion among states will certainly stunt its invocation. Coupled with legislative
amendments restricting the scope of universal jurisdiction by requiring a link to the
forum state, the trajectory of universal jurisdiction appears to be in regression. In
fact, aware of this current down-trend, human rights attorneys are reluctant to

257. Press Release, General Assembly, Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides
Assembly's Legal Committee Delegates; Further Guidance Sought from International Law
Commission, U.N. Press Release GA/L/3415 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/News
/Press/docs/20 11/gal3415.doc.htm [hereinafter Sixth Committee].
258. Id. (providing responses to the principle of "Universal Jurisdiction." For example, the Cuban
delegate stated "the principle needed to be discussed to avoid its misuse," and the Sudanese delegate
noted "the scope of its application raised legal reservations. Universal jurisdiction was directly linked to
the sovereignty of States and the principles of international law.").
259. Id. ("Those entities contributing to Section IV of the report raised a variety of issues, including
the need for clear rules governing the application of universal jurisdiction to ensure its reasonable
exercise; the necessity of considering rights and guarantees that mark the limits of State power,
regardless of where a trial is conducted, once the need to exercise universal jurisdiction becomes
apparent; the necessity of devising a framework of reference under international law for the principles
of universal jurisdiction to specify under what conditions the State is internationally competent to
investigate or prosecute extraterritorial offences; and the need to agree on the extent and applicability of
universal jurisdiction within an all-inclusive multilateral arrangement, such as the United Nations.").
260. Yee, supra note 167, at 510, 522 (noting that not a single case was brought in Africa).
261. Sixth Committee, supra note 257 (explaining that it met to deliberate "on its possible misuse
and imposition on State sovereignty'). The Delegate from Sudan summed it up well when describing
that "[t]he application of the principle was directly linked to the Sovereignty of states," and he noted a
double standard in the understanding of the principle and the selectivity of its practice. Id.
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wield the jurisdictional tool,262 though they have not disavowed it altogether.
Kaleck sums it up when he explains:
We all know about the limitations of international criminal justice not
being able to bring cases against super and regional powers and the only
way to hold them to account is to prosecute them in universal
jurisdiction-if it is only used against fallen dictators and low level
officials, we cannot achieve its purpose . . . it didn't develop like we

imagined fifteen years ago but there is some progress. It is important
that the U.S. torture policy and our accusations have been taken
seriously by the majority of the legal community. Even among
governments, they have taken the evidence seriously. 263
The regressive trend in universal jurisdiction since the Study's publication in
2005 indicates that a more attenuated right to vest universal jurisdiction exists than
the Study originally suggested. The precise scope of the right is not as broad or
unqualified as the ICRC stated. Instead, the fact that specially affected states, like
the African Union as a body, have protested its invocation against sitting heads of
states and have emphasized its abuse 264 indicates that the norm may still be in
formation. Moreover, it shows that the customary right to vest universal
jurisdiction over war crimes is robust only when there exists general international
consensus that an act amounts to a crime and that there should be accountability
for this crime.
In the early nineties, and on the heels of an aborted intervention to stave off
mass murder in Rwanda, the international community responded to internal
conflicts with a vengeance.265 In effect, the global movement to respond to
chilling atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ushered in a revival of
international criminal law whose jurisdictional boundaries were not policed by
sovereign markers. 266 To the contrary, for an intermittent decade, it seemed that
human rights and the claims of individual dignity would police sovereignty's
borders.
During that time dozens of states opened their national courts to hear claims
lacking the traditional jurisdictional links (i.e. active personality, passive
personality, territorial, and national interest) in matters concerning those crimes
considered an affront to all of humanity. 267 The mounting jurisprudence, and the
palpable acquiescence to its exercise, underscored an attitudinal position common
to the community of nations that each nation is empowered to act on behalf of the

262. Kaleck Interview, supra note 170 ("We are very ... reluctant to use the tool because the
attitude of prosecutorial authorities all over Europe is that they won't allow us to bring a case without a
link to the country.").
263. Id.
264. LOUISE ARIMATSU, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: AFRICA'S HOPE
FOR JUSTICE? 4-5 (2010), availableat www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
265. Id. at 4.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 5-6.
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global whole to eradicate impunity for heinous crimes.m Upon this demonstrable
attitudinal position, the ICRC found that states have the right to vest universal
jurisdiction in their national courts over war crimes as a matter of customary
right. 269
The ICRC, however, failed to consider that the momentum to which it was
bearing witness was context-specific. While national courts opened their doors to
hear extra-territorial and extra-national claims, those claims had been rendered
non-controversial by the sweeping endorsement of the U.N. Security Council.
History and politics together established who, where, and what was an enemy to all
humankind, not unlike the historical vectors that made deplorable those Nazi
designs for ethno-national purity while condoning the mass murder of Japanese
civilians in the name of national security. The "enemy of humankind" reflects a
selective humanity, then and now.
As such, the U.S. Government is right to question the status of Rule 157 as a
customary rule.
Though equipped with antiquated modes for identifying
customary international humanitarian law, the U.S. correctly noted that there does
not exist sufficient consensus regarding the scope of war crimes to which
international criminal liability inheres.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the scope, definition, and application of universal jurisdiction generates
ample controversy, its purpose and utility remains uncontested. This speaks to the
permissive nature of the rule as characterized by the ICRC. Unlike other rules,
which create obligations for, or restrictions upon states, a permissive rule stipulates
that no prohibition exists upon state authority. The modern approach to the
formation of customary international humanitarian law is particularly appropriate
as it concerns permissive rules because of the weight that should be afforded to
state attitudes and state protest as opposed to actual state practice alone.
In general, the modem approach is superior in regard to human rights and
humanitarian law because of international society's nature as a collective whole
rather than an aggregate sum of its parts. It is also superior because of the
specialized nature of the human rights and humanitarian legal regimes, and
because of the unreliability of operational state practice. As a result, the methods
inherent to the modern approach, namely a reliance on soft-law instruments as
indicative of opinio juris, the flexibility in identifying a customary norm that has
not hardened, and a diminished reliance upon the practice of specially affected
states, are operative in the assessment of customary international humanitarian law.
To this end, the ICRC was correct in its methodological approach in its Study.
However, its application of the more accurate approach does not predetermine an
accurate outcome.

268. Id. at 7.
269. See VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 604.
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As it stands, the ICRC can confidently argue that states possess a right to vest
universal jurisdiction in their national courts over those crimes benefitting from
universal condemnation irrespective of their international or non-international
character. This is distinct from its broader claim as articulated in Rule 157, which
suggests that states have a customary right to vest universal jurisdiction over war
crimes. As shown here, the approach to customary law does not presuppose a
particular outcome. It is worthwhile to also consider whether choosing between
the traditional and modern approach is relevant at all. Perhaps using other
disciplinary approaches, like sociology or political science, to identify customary
law is more appropriate. Whichever approach is ultimately used, this paper
attempts to demonstrate, in part, that customary law is not subject to mathematical
algorithms and definitive accuracy. To the contrary, customary law is complex
and nonetheless, equally binding on the most powerful and weak states alike.

